PAS and “plain old” suicide

Last week, the folks from the Manhattan Declaration (whose key concern is freedom of religion) sent an email with a series of links—perhaps expanding their remit a smidge—one of which dealt with doctor-assisted suicide.  “Doctor-assisted suicide is contagious,” it said, along with this: “Doctor-assisted suicide increases overall suicide rates among the non-terminally ill everywhere it’s made legal.” And it also linked to a 2015 article on the subject from the Southern Medical Journal.

The SMJ authors were looking at whether overall and non-assisted suicide rates were different in states with legalized assisted death than in other U.S. states.  By their own admission, they did not have as much information as they would have liked.  They reviewed available information between 1990 and 2013. Two of the states were Vermont, which legalized assisted suicide in 2013 and had no cases that year, and Montana, which was not keeping count of assisted suicides.  That left them with assisted suicide data from Oregon (since 1998) and Washington state (since 2008).  (Since then, assisted suicide has also been made legal in Colorado, D.C., Hawaii, and California.)

In those two states, the total number of suicides and the number of non-assisted suicides had increased after the respective dates of legalization of assisted suicide.  However, the number of non-assisted suicides had also increased in the other states combined.  When I looked at their graph of the data, going back to 1990, there had been a decline in non-assisted suicide in Oregon, Washington, and other states between 1990 and 2000, with increases after that.  The number of these deaths per 100,000 population were higher in Oregon and Washington (and, indeed, much higher in Montana) than in the other states, but the slopes of the curves—the rates of increase—in Oregon and Washington looked similar to the other states.  Montana’s increase appeared sharply higher, but it’s hard to conclude anything about assisted suicide in that case because there were no data (nor for Vermont).

The authors commented that there had been estimates of how many surreptitious assisted suicides may have occurred outside of legalization, but admitted that firm conclusions were not possible.  They attempted to establish a statistical association between assisted suicide and nonassisted suicide, but the argument seemed inconclusive.  Follow the above link, read the article, and judge for yourself.

The core conclusion was that assisted suicide in its early years had not decreased overall suicide rates, as some of its advocates had argued it would.  Any relationship may become clearer as more information is available, assuming that numbers of assisted and non-assisted suicides are consistently and completely counted and recorded.  But that assumption is questionable at best.

In the meantime, it is important not to overinterpret limited data sets.  It’s also important to remember there are at least 5 reasons why assisted suicide is a bad idea:  it fundamentally alters the nature of medicine as a healing, life-preserving art and profession; its application cannot be reliably limited to those who freely request death or who are terminally ill (the slippery slope); it risks diverting energy and priority from true palliative care; if understood as a “right to die,” or a “right to be made dead,” it creates a duty for someone else to kill; and the notion of a “right to die” is self-contradictory if rights rest on preservation of life and well-being, as is the classical (i.e., pre-20th century) understanding.

In 2012, in his essay “Four Myths about Doctor-Assisted Suicide,” Ezekiel Emanuel wrote: “Patients themselves say that the primary motive [for assisted suicide] is not to escape physical pain but psychological distress; the main drivers are depression, hopelessness and fear of loss of autonomy and control. Dutch researchers, for a report published in 2005, followed 138 terminally ill cancer patients and found that depressed patients were four times more likely to request euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. Nearly half of those who requested euthanasia were depressed.

“In this light, physician-assisted suicide looks less like a good death in the face of unremitting pain and more like plain old suicide. Typically, our response to suicidal feelings associated with depression and hopelessness is not to give people the means to end their lives but to offer them counseling and caring.”

And “plain old suicide” is, as we know, a problem that is getting worse all over the country.

Britain’s experts on gene-edited babies

by Jon Holmlund

Some of the cable news shows ran segments on the report released this week by Britain’s Nuffield Council on Bioethics, “Genome editing and human reproduction: social and ethical issues.”  Full disclosure: I have not yet read the full report, only the short summaries (all of which are available for free download at the link here).

The TV teasers—”U.K. bioethics council says that gene-editing children may be morally acceptable” were accurate.  The key conclusion is that “the use of heritable genome editing interventions to influence the characteristics of future generations could be ethically acceptable in some circumstances” (emphasis theirs).  But the news folks made it sound like an attempt to birth an edited baby is around the corner, or at least fully green-lighted by Nuffield.

The summary of the report reads more modestly, acknowledging that such attempts are currently banned by law most places, and that making them legal could require “a long and complex legislative pathway.”  But the Council does take the view that at least some attempts, such as those to try to repair a lethal disease gene such as the dominant gene for Huntington’s disease, might be justifiable.  This blog has considered such an argument in the case of sickle cell anemia—single gene defect, well understood, circumscribed attempt to repair only that gene.  An argument can be made.

The Nuffield Council’s summary really is a list of general statements that, taken individually, are hard to take issue with, and are in some cases almost platitudinous.  The overall impression is, “yes, heritable human gene editing could be ethical, and probably should be considered, but only after a long public deliberative process, appropriate regulation, etc., etc.”  Nuffield offers two stipulations for ethically acceptable heritable human gene editing:

  • “Intended to secure, and is consistent with, the welfare of a person who may be born as a consequence” of the effort, and
  • Social justice and solidarity are upheld; that is, discrimination or social division should not be a consequence.

These statements are both too broad to be helpful.  In the first case, the Council acknowledges that some efforts could be attempts to enhance a person’s natural characteristics, not just treat a recognized disease, and that, except for the most genetically straightforward cases, the scientific and technical challenges are substantial.  In the second case, it would seem that pressures for discrimination based on social attitudes or economics (ability to pay for the procedure, medical insurance reimbursement issues) will be unavoidable.

Scientifically and socially, there will be unintended—or at least undesirable—consequences.  These may be known but considered acceptable.  For example, how many human embryos will need to be created and destroyed to perfect the procedure?  How many generations will need to be followed to rule out some late complication?  Can we really guarantee that “having babies the old-fashioned way” won’t become a thing of the past?  And, in spite of the laudable desire to bring healthy children into the world, wouldn’t this be a wholesale acceptance of the basic assumption that only the people we want to be born, should be born?

For these reasons and others previously articulated on this blog, heritable human gene editing falls into a small but critical group of biomedical undertakings that should not be pursued.

And, BTW, the remaining bugs in the system include, as reported this week, that gene-editing techniques appear to introduce errors more frequently than previously appreciated.  Given that heritable human editing involves more than just a few cells in a dish, a “presumption to forebear” should apply.

The TV news gave this about 5 minutes this week.  That’s the breadth and depth of our “public deliberation” beyond a few experts.  At the end of one segment, the host looked into the camera and said, “next up: are liberals or conservatives happier?”

As Neil Postman said:  “now this…”

Forcing RNA to, at least, Mumble…

BY MARK MCQUAIN

We are at a turning point in medicine where instead of supplementing patients with proteins or enzymes that their bodies fail to manufacture due to genetic abnormalities, we soon may be able to re-engineer the abnormal DNA, restoring the DNA’s ability to instruct the body to make those same proteins or enzymes. On our way to full-fledged genetic engineering, we have learned that DNA makes something called RNA, which can be thought of as specific instructions for assembling these vital proteins, telling cells exactly how to assemble protein building blocks, called amino acids, in their proper sequence. Even a very minor disorder in a very long amino acid sequence of a protein can cause that protein to function poorly or not at all. When bad DNA makes bad RNA, or when good RNA gets subsequently damaged or misread, the protein either gets assembled in a garbled fashion, or not at all. Think of RNA as the boss of protein production who can speak clearly, mumble or say nothing at all. Recently, there is one well-known disease where it looks like it is possible to force bad RNA that presently says nothing at all to, at least, mumble.

The disease is Muscular Dystophy (MD) and the missing necessary protein is called dystrophin. Dystrophin is responsible for the structural integrity of muscle. Poorly formed or garbled dystrophin results in a mild form of MD, such as one called Becker Muscular Dystrophy (BMD) where patients can live well into their 40s or 50s. If no dystrophin is produced at all, a severe form of the disease called Duchenne MD (DMD) results, in which muscles simply fall apart over a shorter period of time, causing patients to stop walking in their teens, usually dying in their twenties from cardiac or respiratory muscle failure. While it would be great to restore normal production of dystrophin in patients with DMD, one company called Sarepta, appears to be able to cause patients with DMD, who normally do not make any dystrophin, to produce a garbled dystrophin, giving them a milder BMD-like disease.

Consider the following sentence: “The big red fat cat bit the sly fox and ate the shy jay”. The individual letters represent the RNA sequence and the three letter words represent unique amino acid protein building blocks, resulting in a meaningful protein sentence – think of this as the normal dystrophin protein in a healthy person. If the RNA was missing the 22nd through 24th letters (the 8th word “sly”), the sentence becomes: “The big red fat cat bit the fox and ate the shy jay”. It is a minimally garbled version of the first sentence but still meaningful – think of this as the dysfunctional dystrophin in milder BMD. If the original RNA sequence was missing only the 7th and 8th letters, the sentence becomes: “The big dfa tca tbi tth esl yfo xan dat eth esh yja y”. This sentence has no meaning beyond “The big” – think of this as no dystrophin in severe DMD. If we could get the RNA reader to ignore the first letter “d” in the last RNA sequence, the sentence becomes: “The big fat cat bit the sly fox and ate the shy jay”. We are back to a minimally garbled version of the first sentence but still meaningful – think of this as another dysfunctional protein in a milder “Becker-like” MD. This is how scientists at Sarepta appear to have taken an RNA sequence that originally said nothing and forced it to mumble, producing a new garbled form of dystrophin, which works better than no dystrophin at all.

I realize this has been a long walk in the weeds for some of our regular readers but hopefully it has provided some helpful background into the current treatment of MD and a sense of how much further we have yet to go. I will use this blog entry as background for my next blog entry to discuss some of the bioethics around the cost of getting RNA to mumble.

For now and for me, advancing medical knowledge like this convinces me of how fearfully and wonderfully we are made. (Psalm 139:14)

Raiding the CRISPR

BY JON HOLMLUND

A couple of gene-editing news items from this week’s science literature:

First, Nature reports that a group in my “back yard,” at the University of California San Diego, has tested gene editing using the CRISPR approach in mice.  Recall that CRISPR is an acronym for a particular molecular mechanism, first discovered in bacteria, that is particularly efficient—though not perfectly so!—at editing genes.  The idea is to find a “bad” gene that you’d like to replace, for example to prevent or treat a disease, and edit it to be the normal version of that gene.

The kicker in this particular case in mice is that it tested something called “gene drive.”  In classical genetics, humans (and other higher organisms) have two copies of each gene.  In sexual reproduction each parent passes one copy of the gene to offspring, so the chance of a particular gene being handed down is 50%.

“Gene drive” is a technique designed to change those odds, and make a particular gene “selfish,” and much more likely to be passed on.  In fact, the idea is that transmission would be 100%, or nearly so.  If that worked, then a new gene would soon take over a population of organisms, and every member would, in a few generations, have that gene.

Why might that be a good thing?  Suppose you are interested in pest control, and you could use the technique to make, say, mosquitoes infertile.  Then they would soon all die off.  Or if you had some other “desirable” characteristic, you could make it so all members of a species (rodents?  Cattle?  People?) have that characteristic.  Assuming it’s determined by one gene, that is.

And assuming that the technique works.  In the mouse experiment, efficiency was only 73%.

That’s probably good news.   This is one of those techniques that could have serious unintended consequences if tried in the field.  Scientists have been warning about that.  It looks like it’s a way off, but something else to fret about.

The second item involves a clinical trial to treat sickle cell anemia.  In this one, blood stem cells from a person with the disease are removed from the bloodstream and gene-edited outside the body to make hemoglobin that is not as damaged as in the disease (SCA is an inherited disease in which the red blood cells have abnormal hemoglobin that doesn’t carry oxygen well).  Then the altered cells become the therapy, and are given back to the patient.

The FDA has put a “clinical hold” on this clinical trial.  Exactly why has not been publicly disclosed (it doesn’t have to be), and it sounds like the trial itself hadn’t started yet, but that the company developing it was getting ready to start.  This is, in my view, an approach to gene editing that does not pose special or particularly worrisome ethical issues, because the genetic changes are done on “adult” stem cells to treat an existing individual with a disease in a way that would not entail transmission of altered genes to future generations.

And, probably, it’s a case of “this too shall pass,” and the FDA’s concerns will be answered and the trial will proceed.

But check out the sidebar reporting this in Nature Biotechnology.  If you follow the link you will probably get a prompt asking for payment but I was able to sneak a free read on my screen.  If you go there, read below the separate quote (itself picked up from The New York Times) from Dr. George Church of Harvard:  “Anyone who does synthetic biology [engineering of biological organisms] should be under surveillance, and anyone who does it without a license should be suspect.”  Apparently he said that in response to “the publication of an experiment recreating a virus that has engendered fears that such information could be used to create a bioweapon. ”

The old “dual use problem,” eh?  We should really fret about that.

Risk and reproductive freedom

by Steve Phillips

A recent article in The Atlantic titled “The Overlooked Emotions of Sperm Donation” discusses concerns about the emotional problems and conflicts that can occur in families that turn to sperm donation is a way of creating a child amid infertility. The article focuses mostly on heterosexual couples dealing with male infertility who have used sperm donation. In those families there are commonly emotional problems faced by the man when the couple has a child to which he is not genetically related, and there are problems that can occur between the couple who is raising the child and the sperm donor and his family when a known or related donor is involved. The author expresses concern that many couples who choose sperm donation are not aware that these emotional problems can commonly occur and fail to reflect carefully about these concerns or do preventive counseling to deal with them.

The article is well-written and raises concerns that people need to be aware of, but there are some things that are missing. The author briefly addresses the emotional concerns of the child and mentions that there have been some children’s books written to help children deal with those concerns, but the emotional difficulties for a child conceived in this way are very significant. There is also no discussion of whether concern about the emotional difficulties for all the parties involved including the child, the parents raising the child, and the donor and his family might be a reason to consider not having a child by means of sperm donation. There is an underlying assumption of reproductive freedom, the idea that people should be free to fulfill their desire to have a child by any means that they choose. The author properly advocates for the position that potential parents considering this option should be fully informed about the emotional risks as well as any physical risks and should consider preventive counseling, but never mentions the possibility of deciding not to create a child in this way because of the risks.

When we discuss the risks of reproductive technologies, whether those be physical risks or emotional risks, we need to remember that imposing risks on a child to fulfill the desires of an adult individual or an adult couple is a serious moral concern. Despite our society’s focus on autonomy, there are some things we should not do to meet our own desires when doing so puts another person at risk, particularly if the person being put at risk is a child that we are creating.

Labs are growing human embryos for longer than ever before

BY JON HOLMLUND

That’s only a slight paraphrase of a news feature article this week in Nature.  The clearly-written article is devoid of scientific jargon, with helpful illustrations, open-access online, and readily accessible to the non-specialist.  Check it out.

Key points include:

  • Scientists who do not find it ethically unacceptable to create and destroy human embryos solely for research purposes continue to follow the so-called “14-day rule,” by which such experimentation is limited to the first 14 days after fertilization. At that point, the human nervous system starts to form and the time for twinning is past.
  • The 14-day rule is law in some nations, but until now has not been a practical issue because scientists have been unable to grow human embryos that long in the laboratory.
  • That technical limit has been sufficiently overcome that embryos are now surviving for almost 14 days. Scientists have not directly challenged the 14-day rule yet, but might, and would like to revisit it.
  • Experiments on human embryos in that time have included editing of critical genes to see what happens (sometimes they stop growing), and making hybrids of animal embryos with human cells whose purpose is to “organize” embryonic development rather than remain part of the developing individual.
  • Embryo-like structures, referred to as “embryoids” in the article, and sounding similar to “SHEEFs” (“synthetic human entities with embryo-like features”) are also being created. These entities don’t necessarily develop nervous systems in the same way as a natural embryo, prompting questions of just how much they are like natural embryos, whether the 14-day rule applies, and whether they raise other ethical concerns.

The last paragraph of the article, reproduced here with emphases added, is striking and more than a little ironic in light of arguments that embryos are “just a clump of cells”:

As the results of this research accumulate, the technical advances are inspiring a mixture of fascination and unease among scientists. Both are valuable reactions, says [Josephine] Johnston [bioethicist from the Hastings Center]. “That feeling of wonder and awe reminds us that this is the earliest version of human beings and that’s why so many people have moral misgivings,” she says. “It reminds us that this is not just a couple of cells in a dish.”

The essence of humanity

BY STEVE PHILLIPS

Over the past few days I have been reflecting on this year’s CBHD conference which was titled Bioethics and Being Human. In reviewing all the thought-provoking presentations and discussions, I think the opening address by Dennis Hollinger impacted me the most. His talk was entitled Why Humanness Is the Key to Bioethics. He began by saying that in the culture around us the focus has shifted from concept of human dignity to the concept of humanness or what it means to be human. He suggested the technology which is developing artificial intelligence that may be able to reason and robots that take on roles that we have traditionally considered to be human raises questions about what counts as a human being.

The core of what he said related to the idea that there has been a shift in how the culture around us thinks about these things. Our surrounding culture now questions whether there can be an essence of realities. If the existentialist assertion that existence precedes essence is true and there is nothing outside the self to define the self, all our concepts, including our understanding of humanness, become subjective.

Those of us who see the world from a biblical Christian viewpoint understand that there are objective realities in the world. We see that human beings do have a nature, a humanness, that is not subjectively defined, but it is an objective reality that exists due to how we have been created by God. We find that objective understanding of what it means to be human represented in the ultimate human being, Jesus.

But how do we express this understanding of an objective reality of humanness to people in a culture that believes that everything is subjective? I think Hollinger suggested a strategy when he identified the ironies of our surrounding culture’s thinking. He said that the surrounding culture rejects humanness, but longs for relationship; rejects intrinsic moral norms, but longs to be treated justly and honestly; and rejects human meaning, but longs for something beyond. We live within a culture that leaves people without a solid foundation for meaning, relationship, and values. That foundation is available in the God who created us and in his Son, who became one of us, died for us, and rose again to redeem us. He is the essence of humanity and we can share Him with those around us who are deeply in need of the hope that He can provide.

A Supreme Court of One

BY MARK MCQUAIN

Like Neil Skjoldal in yesterday’s blog entry, I, too, am a Supreme Court watcher and enjoy reading their decisions as some might enjoy watching a good sports match or listening to a beautiful symphony. Nerd that I am, I find a well-articulated argument a beautiful thing to behold, even when it runs counter to my bioethics, as it can be a learning experience to help me sharpen my counter argument. My counter argument becomes moot if five or more Justices concur with that original argument, as it is rare, though not impossible, for the Court to completely reverse itself.

Last week, the legal landscape suffered the equivalent of a San Andreas-like major tremor along its political fault-line with the announced retirement of Associate Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy. Justice Kennedy has generally been considered the political center of the Court, the all-important tiebreaker, if you will, on controversial bioethical issues related to abortion, gay marriage and the death penalty. Presently, we give 9 Justices the authority to be the final interpreters of our laws, including those that determine our collective bioethics. Amazingly, we will accept a majority rule 5-4 split decision as being just as acceptable as a 9-0 unanimous decision when validating or invalidating our laws. Being the tiebreaker on previous controversial issues effectively made Justice Kennedy what I call “a Supreme Court of One”. And that is exactly how both political parties are treating the selection of Justice Kennedy’s replacement.

And they should.

In a past blog entry, I tried to make the case that it vitally matters who is interpreting our Constitution, as those individuals are grounding our secular bioethics. Allowing one tie-breaker to decide these important issues is too much power and responsibility in one individual but that has been the reality in our presently divided Court.

My favorite legal philosopher is the late Yale Law School professor Arthur Leff. He gave a lecture at the Duke University Law School in the late 1970s called “Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law”. He made the case that if our source of right and wrong is anything other than a transcendental (unnatural) source, then the resulting ethics/law is always open to challenge. The U.S. Constitution is an example of a natural source of law, perhaps the best that mankind can create for itself, but, since it was created by us, it is therefore always open to challenge by us. Given its internal checks and balances, as long as “We the People” continue to agree to be governed by the Constitution (and this is by no means a permanent agreement), rulings by the Supreme Court essentially function as our collective approval of laws that determine our national bioethics.

I have shared the following quote from Leff’s lecture before but it again seems appropriate:

As long as the Constitution is accepted, or at least not overthrown, it successfully functions as a God would in a valid ethical system: its restrictions and accommodations govern. They could be other than they are, but they are what they are, and that is that. There will be, as with all divine pronouncements, a continuous controversy over what God says, but whatever the practical importance of the power to determine those questions, they are theoretically unthreatening. It is only when the Constitution ceases to be seen as fulfilling God’s normative role, ceases, that is, to be outside the normative system it totally constitutes, or when, as is impossible with a real God, it is seen to have “gaps,” that a crisis comes to exist. What “wins” when the Constitution will not say, or says two things at the same time?

Presently, the Supreme Court interprets those gaps and decides what wins and what loses in our national bioethics debates. Given our present evenly split Court, picking the next Supreme Court of One can literally make all the bioethical difference in the world.

Goodbye, Korematsu

BY NEIL SKJOLDAL

Supreme Court watchers always eagerly anticipate the last week of June because that is when the highest court in the land usually reaches decisions in its most controversial cases.  Last week did not disappoint — several of the decisions were reached by the slimmest of majorities (the infamous 5-4 vote). Then, to add to the excitement, one of the longest serving justices, Anthony Kennedy, announced his retirement, giving the talking heads of cable news seemingly endless fodder for roundtable discussions.

In the midst of the frenzy, a few observers noted the words of Chief Justice John Roberts at the end of his Trump v. Hawaii opinion.  The dissent in the case brought up Korematsu, the decision from the 1940s which concluded that the internment of American citizens of Japanese descent was constitutional.  Roberts disagreed with the dissent, but offered this assessment of Korematsu:

“The dissent’s reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is al­ready obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has no place in law under the Constitu­tion.’ 323 U. S., at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).”

Bioethics should affirm the basic dignity of all humanity.  It reacts strongly to governments using people for experimentation against their will, or to the preferential treatment of one people group over another, or any number of other abuses that have arisen over the years.  Those from the Judeo-Christian perspective often link this to the biblical teaching of the image of God (see the powerful book by John Kilner, Dignity and Destiny).  From my perspective, it means hearing the voice of those who do not normally have a voice and affirming the rights of those whom society so casually overlooks.

Looking back seventy-plus years, Chief Justice Roberts sees the issues of Korematsu clearly.  Sadly, for the many American citizens of Japanese descent interred during the Second World War, there were only three Supreme Court justices who stood with them against such horrific treatment.   Korematsu is a sobering reminder of what can happen when the powerful trample the powerless.  During this Fourth of July week, I will celebrate that this decision has been placed in its rightful place, the ash heap of history.

 

 

 

Vaccines: Modern Trolley Car Dilemmas

BY MARK MCQUAIN

The Trolley Car dilemma is back in bioethics news. For those unfamiliar with the trolley car dilemma, you alone are responsible to operate a trolley track switch to divert an out-of-control trolley car away from five workers on one section of track only to cause the death of a lone worker on the only alternate section of track. The dilemma: someone is going to die, and you get to decide who. In a recent editorial in the June 13th New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Lisa Rosenbaum nicely describes the utilitarian dilemma surrounding the public health risks and benefits associated with a vaccine for the dengue virus, a mosquito-borne virus that annually causes significant severe illness and death worldwide. The dengue vaccine, Dengvaxia, is a real-world trolley car dilemma. Dengvaxia presently can protect large numbers of patients from this deadly virus, but at the expense of causing severe illness and death in a much smaller number of patients, mostly children.

Dr. Rosenbaum describes our response to utilitarian thinking, correctly I think. We don’t mind utilitarian rules that negatively affect others, particularly when the rules tend to confer benefit to our group as a whole (the very definition of utilitarianism) but we resist utilitarian thinking when it threatens to affect us negatively as an individual despite overall benefit to the rest of our group. Healthy self-interest often conflicts with the utilitarian calculus that purports to determine the overall benefit to the group. In the case of Dengvaxia, if the deaths caused by the vaccine only occurred in people who would have died from the natural dengue virus anyway, there would be no problem. In other words, by golly, you all were going to die from the widespread disease anyway, and since the vaccine did save some of you from dying, there is really no new or additional loss. Net positive outcome, right?

Sadly, vaccines do not work that way. With Dengvaxia, it may be possible to create a pre-vaccine test for seropositivity for the virus. This would mean determining whether a person previously had a very mild case of the virus such that they would not suffer a catastrophic outcome from receiving the vaccine, thereby allowing them to safely receive the vaccine to prevent a more severe case of dengue in the future. Such a screening test may be possible but it would cost some unknown amount of additional money and would still not be 100% accurate. Even so, no vaccine is 100% safe.

How many lives would need to be saved and at what cost before we are satisfied with the cost/benefit ratio of Dengvaxia (or any vaccine for that matter)? Presently the World Health Organization is recommending a pre-vaccination test be developed and only vaccinate those who test positive for prior exposure. This is effectively saying that the vaccination is not only not required but not even presently recommended in endemic regions, this despite the fact that Dengvaxia clearly significantly reduces overall mortality and morbidity. If the disease were more contagious and more lethal than dengue, at what point does the vaccine, however imperfect, become mandatory? This is the ultimate trolley car switch for public health officials.

Aren’t trolley car dilemmas fun?