Risk and reproductive freedom

A recent article in The Atlantic titled “The Overlooked Emotions of Sperm Donation” discusses concerns about the emotional problems and conflicts that can occur in families that turn to sperm donation is a way of creating a child amid infertility. The article focuses mostly on heterosexual couples dealing with male infertility who have used sperm donation. In those families there are commonly emotional problems faced by the man when the couple has a child to which he is not genetically related, and there are problems that can occur between the couple who is raising the child and the sperm donor and his family when a known or related donor is involved. The author expresses concern that many couples who choose sperm donation are not aware that these emotional problems can commonly occur and fail to reflect carefully about these concerns or do preventive counseling to deal with them.

The article is well-written and raises concerns that people need to be aware of, but there are some things that are missing. The author briefly addresses the emotional concerns of the child and mentions that there have been some children’s books written to help children deal with those concerns, but the emotional difficulties for a child conceived in this way are very significant. There is also no discussion of whether concern about the emotional difficulties for all the parties involved including the child, the parents raising the child, and the donor and his family might be a reason to consider not having a child by means of sperm donation. There is an underlying assumption of reproductive freedom, the idea that people should be free to fulfill their desire to have a child by any means that they choose. The author properly advocates for the position that potential parents considering this option should be fully informed about the emotional risks as well as any physical risks and should consider preventive counseling, but never mentions the possibility of deciding not to create a child in this way because of the risks.

When we discuss the risks of reproductive technologies, whether those be physical risks or emotional risks, we need to remember that imposing risks on a child to fulfill the desires of an adult individual or an adult couple is a serious moral concern. Despite our society’s focus on autonomy, there are some things we should not do to meet our own desires when doing so puts another person at risk, particularly if the person being put at risk is a child that we are creating.

Labs are growing human embryos for longer than ever before

That’s only a slight paraphrase of a news feature article this week in Nature.  The clearly-written article is devoid of scientific jargon, with helpful illustrations, open-access online, and readily accessible to the non-specialist.  Check it out.

Key points include:

  • Scientists who do not find it ethically unacceptable to create and destroy human embryos solely for research purposes continue to follow the so-called “14-day rule,” by which such experimentation is limited to the first 14 days after fertilization. At that point, the human nervous system starts to form and the time for twinning is past.
  • The 14-day rule is law in some nations, but until now has not been a practical issue because scientists have been unable to grow human embryos that long in the laboratory.
  • That technical limit has been sufficiently overcome that embryos are now surviving for almost 14 days. Scientists have not directly challenged the 14-day rule yet, but might, and would like to revisit it.
  • Experiments on human embryos in that time have included editing of critical genes to see what happens (sometimes they stop growing), and making hybrids of animal embryos with human cells whose purpose is to “organize” embryonic development rather than remain part of the developing individual.
  • Embryo-like structures, referred to as “embryoids” in the article, and sounding similar to “SHEEFs” (“synthetic human entities with embryo-like features”) are also being created. These entities don’t necessarily develop nervous systems in the same way as a natural embryo, prompting questions of just how much they are like natural embryos, whether the 14-day rule applies, and whether they raise other ethical concerns.

The last paragraph of the article, reproduced here with emphases added, is striking and more than a little ironic in light of arguments that embryos are “just a clump of cells”:

As the results of this research accumulate, the technical advances are inspiring a mixture of fascination and unease among scientists. Both are valuable reactions, says [Josephine] Johnston [bioethicist from the Hastings Center]. “That feeling of wonder and awe reminds us that this is the earliest version of human beings and that’s why so many people have moral misgivings,” she says. “It reminds us that this is not just a couple of cells in a dish.”

A safety concern with gene editing

Hat-tip to Dr. Joe Kelley for bring this to my attention…

As readers of this blog will recall, there is keen interest in exploiting recent discoveries in genetic engineering to “edit” disease-causing gene mutations and develop treatments for various diseases.  Initially, such treatments would likely use a patient’s own cells—removed from the body, edited to change the cells’ genes in a potentially therapeutic way, then return the altered cells to the patient’s bloodstream to find their way to the appropriate place and work to treat the disease.  How that would work could differ—make the cells do something they wouldn’t normally do, or make them do something better than they otherwise do (as in altering immune cells to treat cancer); or maybe make them work normally so that the normal function would replace the patient’s diseased function (as in altering blood cells for people with sickle cell anemia so that the altered cells make normal hemoglobin to replace the person’s diseased hemoglobin).

Or maybe we could even edit out a gene that causes disease (sickle cell anemia, Huntington’s disease) or increases the risk of disease (e.g., BRCA and cancer) so that future generations wouldn’t inherit it.  Or maybe we could edit genes to enhance certain health-promoting or other desirable qualities.

The recent scientific enthusiasm for gene editing is fueled by the discovery of the relatively slick and easy-to-use (if you’re a scientist, anyway) CRISPR-Cas9 system, which is a sort of immune system for bacteria but can be used to edit/alter genes in a lot of different kinds of cells.

It turns out that cells’ normal system to repair gene damage can and does thwart this, reducing the efficiency of the process.  The key component to this is something called p53, a critical protein that, if abnormal, may not do its repair job so well.  When that happens, the risk of cancer increases, often dramatically.  In cancer research, abnormal p53 is high on the list of culprits to look out for.

Two groups of scientists, one from the drug company Novartis and one from the Karolinska Institute in Sweden, have published on this.  P53’s thwarting of gene editing is particularly active in pluripotent stem cells, that are some, but not the only, candidate cells to be edited to create treatments.  These cells are also constituent cells of human embryos.  If the CRISPR-Cas9 process is used on these cells, p53 usually kills them off—unless it’s lacking or deficient, in which case it doesn’t, but also in which case it means that the altered cells could themselves become cancers, later on.

This is something that has to be monitored carefully in developing cells as medicines, so to speak, with genetic editing.  One does not want the patient to appear to be healed, only to develop a cancer, or a new cancer, later on.  One certainly would want to know the risk of that before editing an embryo—an unborn human, a future baby if placed in the right environment—to create a gene-edited human being.

Yet, as I’ve written here in the past, it appears that experimentation in heritable gene editing is pressing on.  I’ve argued, and continue to argue, that heritable human gene editing is a line that must not be crossed, that would place too much trust in the providence of the scientists/technologists who are the “actors” exerting power over fellow humans who become “subjects” in a deep sense of the term; that the risks to the subjects are undefinable; that it would enable perception of humans as “engineering projects”; that the gift of life would tend to be replaced by seeking to limit birth to “the people we want”; that the people acted upon are unable to provide consent or know what risks have been chosen for them by others, even before birth.  Rather than press ahead, we in the human race should exercise a “presumption to forbear.”

A counter argument is that, in limited cases where the genetic defect is limited and known, the disease is terrible, treatment alternatives are few or none, that the risks are worth it.  The recent papers seem to expose that line as a bit too facile.  How many embryos created (and destroyed) to develop the technique before “taking it live?”  Could we work things out in animals—monkeys, maybe?  How many generations to alter, create, and follow to be sure that a late risk—such as cancer—does not emerge?  Or maybe our animal rights sensibilities stop us from putting monkeys at such risk—maybe mice will do?

The new papers are dense science.  Frankly, I can grasp the topline story but have trouble digesting all the details.  More sophisticated readers will not be so impaired.  The news report, in the English of the general public, can be read here, the Novartis and Karolinska reports read (but not downloaded or printed) here and here, respectively.

Citizenship, Surrogacy and the Power of ART

A recent LA Times article by Alene Tchekmedyian explores a complicated case involving birthright citizenship, surrogacy and same-sex marriage. Briefly, a California man, Andrew Banks, married an Israeli man, Elad Dvash, in 2010. At the time, same-sex marriage was not legal in the US leaving Elad unable to acquire a green card for residency (via the marriage) so the couple moved to Canada where Andrew has dual citizenship. While in Canada, the couple conceived twin boys, Aiden and Ethan, using assisted reproduction technology (ART) whereby eggs from an anonymous donor were fertilized by sperm from Elad and Andrew and then implanted within the womb of a female surrogate and carried to term. When the US Supreme Court struck down the federal law that denied benefits to legally married gay couples in 2013, Elad applied for and was granted his greed card. The present controversy occurred when Andrew and Elad applied for US passports for the twins. US State Department officials required detailed explanation of the boys’ conception, eventually requiring DNA tests which confirmed Aiden to be the biological son of Andrew and Ethan to be the biological son of Elad. Aiden was granted a US passport while Ethan was denied. The family has since traveled to the US (Elad with his green card and Ethan with his Canadian passport and temporary 6 month visa) where they are now suing the State Department for Ethan’s US birthright citizenship. They are arguing that the current applicable statute places them wrongly in the category of children born out of wedlock rather than recognizing their marriage, thus discriminating against them as a binational LGBTQ couple.

Birthright citizenship is a complicated legal arena and I am no lawyer. The US is even more complicated because we allow birthright citizenship to be conferred jus soli (right of the soil) in addition to jus sanguinis (right of blood). The twins were not born in the US so establishing “bloodline” is needed. The law specifies conditions where one parent is a US citizen and one is not a US citizen, and there is further differentiation depending on whether the children of the US citizen were born in or out of wedlock. They also vary depending on whether the US citizen is male or female, with the law more lenient (easier to acquire citizenship) for the child of a woman than of a man.

While the legal challenge here will almost certainly involve potential issues of discrimination of LGBTQ binational couples, the problem is really with the current legal definitions of parent as it relates to surrogacy in general. The State Department actually has a website dedicated answering questions related to foreign surrogacy and citizenship. The real issue is that the State Department relies upon genetic proof of parentage for foreign surrogacy births. In the present case, the surrogacy occurred outside the US, Elad is the genetic father of Ethan and Elad is not a US citizen; therefore Ethan is not a US citizen. While I’m deep in the weeds here, technically, Aiden and Ethan are not fraternal twins in the usual sense but rather half siblings (and this assumes that the donor eggs are from the same woman; otherwise the boys would be unrelated despite sharing the same pregnant womb through the magic of ART). Had Ethan been physically born via surrogacy in the US, he would have acquired his citizenship via jus soli (see US map for surrogacy friendly states near you).

This problem is just as confounding for heterosexual couples using foreign surrogates, and the problem is global. A more detailed technical legal discussion may be found here. A heterosexual couple using donor eggs and donor sperm and using a foreign third party surrogate would have exactly the same problem establishing US citizenship for “their” child. A similar problem would exist for an adopted embryo gestated in a foreign country by a foreign surrogate. If either the egg or the sperm of the US citizen is used for the surrogate birth, the child would be granted birthright citizenship.

The main difference for homosexual couples is that only one spouse can presently be the biological parent. I say “presently” because with ART it is theoretically possible (and may become actually possible in the future) to convert a human somatic cell into either a male sperm or a female egg. At that point, both spouses within a same-sex marriage could be the biological parents of their child. The present legal issue is not the result of a cultural prejudice against anyone’s sexuality but with the biological prejudice of sex itself. ART has the potential ability to blur the categories of sex as culture is now blurring the categories of gender. Should we consider this a good thing?

Given the present technological limits of ART, the simple issue of US citizenship could be resolved in all these cases if the US citizen parent simply adopted the child. Elad correctly points out that while adoption of Ethan by Andrew would grant Ethan US citizenship, it would not grant Ethan birthright citizenship, a necessary requirement for Ethan to someday run for US president. ART may be forcing us to look at changing our definition of parent but should it change our definition of biology? Ethan is the biological son of Elad. He is able to be the legally adopted son of Andrew and enjoy the benefits of US citizenship as currently does his half brother Aiden. He is not able to become the biological son of Andrew and enjoy the additional benefit of birthright citizenship via jus sanguinis.

Should we change the definition of birthright citizenship because ART is changing our definition of parent?

Fertility with frozen eggs: not a sure thing

In case you didn’t see it, the Washington Post has this story about how more women are trying to improve their overall chances of having a baby—particularly in the later reproductive years of their 30’s and 40’s—but success is far from certain.  Human oocytes (eggs) are fragile things, and it was not until recent years that freezing techniques developed to a point that would allow the eggs to survive being frozen and, some time later, thawed (the “freeze-thaw” cycle).  Then, they would be fertilized in the lab, by in vitro fertilization, and implanted into the womb of the would-be mother.

As the article points out, women are born with their entire endowment of eggs, which become less likely to be successfully fertilized and develop into a healthy baby as they, and the woman, age.  Hence a woman’s inexorably declining fertility, particularly from their mid-30’s on.  Freezing eggs for later use is increasingly popular, if one can afford it, or if employers offer it as a perk, as some do, to their female employees.

It’s still expensive, and success appears to depend on the age of the woman (and eggs) at their harvest, and the number harvested and kept in frozen storage.  One must use the qualifier “appears,” because, as the article also points out, reliable statistics are not being kept.  The not-so-subtle implication is that the fertility “industry” wants to sell the process but would rather not know that the ultimate success rate could be as low as, or lower than, the 50-60% rate quoted by New York University.

Clear implications: better data and more transparency are to be desired, and there appear to be at least some remaining biologic limits, strong if not absolute, to reproductive freedom.  Beyond that, as I opined in May of 2013 (fairly bluntly, I do confess) are the radical implications for our concepts of parenthood and begetting children, and for turning said procreation into just plain old, quality-controlled, fully artificial creation.  Things haven’t gotten quite so absolute, yet.  But better quality control of egg freezing and the outcomes, if possible, would be a move in the direction of more artificial reproduction.

It’s a good article from the Post.  Too much to try to do justice to here.  Read the whole thing.

Selection of embryos in IVF to increase birth rates

A recent article in the Daily Mail brought my attention to recent research by the British assisted reproduction scientist Simon Fishel (see abstract) on a technique which can help select which early developing embryos produced by IVF are most likely to result in a live birth when they are implanted. This technique in evolves repeatedly photographing the developing embryos and using a computerized process to assess which embryos are showing the developmental characteristics that are associated with successful live birth. The study indicates that they were able to achieve a 19% increase in the number of live births in women under age 38 and a 37% increase in live births in women over age 37 by using this technique compared to conventional ways of selecting the healthiest appearing embryos.

On the surface the study appears to be about a simple process for making a particular form of biotechnology more effective and more efficient. What caught my eye from an ethical standpoint was the way in which this study demonstrates how biotechnology is so completely focused on the fulfillment of human desires that it tends to ignore any other concerns. The human desire that drives infertility treatment is the desire to give birth to a baby. The study shows how a particular improvement in technique makes it possible to fulfill that desire in a higher percentage of patients. What is interesting is that the focus on fulfilling that desire is so complete that there is no mention of what happens to the embryos that are not selected when their photographs are input into the computer-generated profile for selecting the best embryos. It also says nothing about whether the babies who are born using this process are healthier or less healthy than those using conventional techniques. The sole focus is on whether the desire to give birth to a baby is fulfilled.

Having technology that can help us fulfill our desires can be beneficial, but effective technology tends to be very focused on what it accomplishes. Life and particularly the moral life is more complex than that. We need to evaluate our desires to see if they are worthwhile. We need to consider what effects it may have on others if our desires are fulfilled. Since technology is successful when it fulfills our desires it may lead us to think that we are doing well when we have effective ways to fulfill those desires, without stopping to consider whether our desires and the means that we choose to fulfill them are good.

Christmas and the personhood of the unborn

One of the most interesting details of the account of Jesus’ birth in the gospels is what happened when Mary visited her cousin Elizabeth. Luke tells us in the first chapter of his gospel that Elizabeth and her husband Zechariah were infertile and beyond their childbearing years. The angel Gabriel appeared to Zechariah and told him that he and his wife were going to have a son who would prepare the way for the coming of the Lord. Elizabeth did indeed become pregnant and when she was in her sixth month the same angel appeared to Mary and told her that she was going to conceive a son, Jesus, who would be the Son of God. Immediately after this, Mary went to stay with Elizabeth. When she greeted Elizabeth her fetus, who was later known as John the Baptist, leaped for joy in Elizabeth’s womb.

This account raises some interesting thoughts about the personhood of the unborn. Luke is clearly saying that John, who was at this time a 6-month fetus, had the spiritual insight to recognize Mary as the mother of Jesus. That would indicate the Holy Spirit was already working in the life of John before he was born and it would be hard to say that he was not a person when this occurred. He was already beginning to fulfill his role as the one who would announce the Messiah when he was 3 months from being born.

Less clear, but even more interesting, is the unstated possibility that what John was responding to was the presence of Jesus himself. If Jesus was conceived shortly after the angel appeared to Mary, and she went immediately to stay with Elizabeth, Jesus would have been an embryo at the time of John’s leaping for joy. If John as a fetus was responding to the presence of Jesus as an embryo, we have reason to confirm the personhood of a human embryo.

Whether John was responding to the presence of Mary or the presence of Jesus, it is the incarnation of Jesus that provides one of the strongest reasons for us to understand that every human being has great worth. Every human being has great value because each one is made in the image of God, but the incarnation tells even more. That fact that Jesus became a human being elevates human beings to a value above other created beings. Since we have been told that he was conceived in Mary’s womb, he grew as an embryo and fetus before being born in Bethlehem and has elevated the value of the unborn as well as those who have been born.

God bless us every one, including those who are not yet born.

Seeing having children as a harm

A recent Breakpoint article led me to read an opinion piece on nbcnews.com by Travis Rieder, a research scholar with the Berman Institute of Bioethics at Johns Hopkins, titled “Science proves kids are bad for Earth. Morality suggests we stop having them.” Rieder references several articles that indicate that the most effective way that individuals, particularly those in affluent societies, can reduce their impact on climate change is by having fewer children. The articles that he references suggest that having fewer children would have a much bigger impact than any conservation measures that we might take.

It is important to be clear that in spite of the title of the article Rieder is not advocating that we have no children or that there should be a specific limit on how many children people have. However, he is saying that each child that we bring into the world represents a negative impact on our environment and that we have a moral obligation to consider that harm in our moral decision-making about having children. He deals with some possible objections to his position in which include concerns about whether a child’s environmental impact is the responsibility of the child or the parent, and the idea that individual actions place such a small role in global issues such as climate change that they are insignificant.

However, I think that he fails to consider the most significant objection to his position. By suggesting that the net effect of having a child can be considered a moral harm, he is failing to consider the immense value of an individual human life in his reasoning. This is primarily because he is seeing moral decisions consequentially. One of the failings of consequential or utilitarian moral thinking is to look only at measurable consequences and to neglect the more difficult to measure value of individual human lives. The immeasurable value of a human life makes it difficult to see the act of bringing a child into the world as something that involves more harm than good. There may be some situations in which it is morally proper to decide not to conceive a child with a high likelihood of intense suffering. Beyond that the value of a human life is greater than presumed consequences.

Uterine Transplantation – for Men?

Susan Haack began exploring the topic of uterine transplantation in women on this blog back in February 2014. In just under 4 short years, the technology has not only successfully resulted in live births in several women who received the uterine transplants, but outgoing president of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine, Dr. Richard Paulson, is suggesting we consider exploring the technique in men. While there are certainly hurdles to overcome (need for cesarean section for the actual birth, hormone supplementation, complicated nature of the transplant even for cisgender women), Dr. Paulson does not consider these barriers insurmountable for transgender women.

Dr. Julian Savulescu, professor of practical ethics at Oxford, has cautioned that initiating a pregnancy in a transgender woman may be unethical if it poses significant risk to the fetus. The above-linked article misquotes his concern as a concern over “any psychological harm to the child born in this atypical way”. The following is his actual quote from his own blog:

Therefore, although technically possible to perform the procedure, you would need to be very confident the uterus would function normally during pregnancy. The first US transplant had to be removed because of infection. There are concerns about insufficient blood flow in pregnancy and pre-eclampsia. A lot of research would need to be done not just on the transplant procedure but on the effect in pregnancy in non-human animals before it was trialled in humans. Immunosuppressives would be necessary which are risky. A surrogate uterus would be preferable from the future child’s perspective to a transplanted uterus. Uterine transplantation represents a real risk to the fetus, and therefore the future child. We ought to (other things being equal) avoid exposing future children to unnecessary significant risks of harm.

One putative benefit might be the psychological benefit to the future mother of carrying her own pregnancy. This would have to be weighed against any harm to the child of being born in this atypical way.

His concerns are the baseline medical risks involved in using a transplanted uterus to conceive a child regardless of the sex of the recipient. None of his concerns relate to the psychological harm to the child potentially caused by a uterine transplantation in a transgender woman as opposed to a cisgender woman. Savulescu is explicit in the beginning of his blog that “[t]he ethical issues of performing a womb transplant for a [sic] transgender women are substantially the same as the issues facing ciswomen.” Is the only risk to the child “born this atypical way” just the additional need for hormone supplementation in the transgender woman compared to the cisgender woman? Can we really know, a priori, what all of the attendant risks to the child really are with uterine transplantation in a transgender woman?

Regardless, let’s assume Savulescu is correct, that there is indeed no ethical difference between carrying a child to term via uterine transplantation between a cisgender woman and a transgender woman. There certainly can be no ethical difference between carrying a child to term via uterine transplantation between a transgender woman and a cisgender man. If the foregoing is true, can there be any ethical barrier preventing a man via uterine transplantation to use his sperm to fertilize a donor egg and carry his baby to term? After all, per Savulescu, all we need be concerned about from a bioethical standpoint are the technical issues/risks of uterine transplantation regardless of the recipient’s biological sex or self-identified gender.

In Genesis, God created two complimentary sexes and stated this difference was good. We are moving toward eliminating differences between the sexes and arguing that this is good. Both of us cannot be correct.

I wonder if Dr Haack thought that we would get this far down this particular bioethical slippery slope in four short years?

Is Your Polygenic Risk Score a Good Thing?

Back in October, Jon Holmlund wrote a blog entry regarding the popular company 23andMe and their collection of your health-related information along with your genetic material. I missed the significance of that relationship at the time. It took a recent article in Technology Review by my favorite technology writer Antonio Regalado to raise my ethical antennae. In his article, he explains the nexus of big data mining of genetic data and health information (such as is collected by 23andMe) and its future potential use to select embryos for IVF, selecting not only against polygenic diseases such as type 1 diabetes but potentially for non-diseases such as height, weight or even IQ.


Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) already is used to select for particular embryos for IVF implantation that do not have genetic patterns such as cystic fibrosis or Down syndrome. Diseases that result from multiple genes (polygenic disorders) presently defy current PGD methods used to detect future diseases. Using Big Data analysis of health information compared against linked genetic data, scientists are getting better at accurate polygenic risk scores, statistical models which may more accurately ‘guess’ at an embryo’s future risk for not only juvenile diabetes but also later-in-life diseases (such as heart disease, ALS or glaucoma) or other less threatening inheritable traits (such as eye color, height or IQ) that result from multiple genes (and perhaps even environmental factors). There is confidence (hubris?) that with enough data and enough computing power, we can indeed accurately predict an embryo’s future health status and all of his or her inheritable traits. Combine that further with all of the marketing data available from Madison Avenue, and we can predict what type and color of car that embryo will buy when he or she is 35.

Ok, maybe not the color…

Seriously, companies such as Genomic Prediction would like to see IVF clinics eventually use their expanded statistical models to assist in PGD, using a proprietary technique they are calling Expanded Pre-implantation Genomic Testing (EPGT). Consider the following two quotes from Regalado’s article:

I remind my partners, “You know, if my parents had this test, I wouldn’t be here,” says [founding Genomic Prediction partner and type 1 diabetic Nathan] Treff, a prize-winning expert on diagnostic technology who is the author of more than 90 scientific papers.

For adults, risk scores [such as calculated by 23andMe] are little more than a novelty or a source of health advice they can ignore. But if the same information is generated about an embryo, it could lead to existential consequences: who will be born, and who stays in a laboratory freezer.

Regalado’s last comment is dead-on – literally. Who will be born and who stays in the freezer is another way of saying “who lives and who dies”.

Technologies such as EPGT are poised to take us further down the bioethical slope of choosing which of our children we want to live and which we choose to die. For the sake of driving this point home, let’s assume that the technology becomes essentially 100% accurate with regard to polygenic risk scoring and we can indeed determine which embryo will have any disease or trait. Since we already permit the use of single gene PGD to prevent certain genetic outcomes, should there be any limit to polygenic PGD? For instance:

(A) Should this technology be used to select against immediate life threatening illnesses only or also against immediate mentally or physically permanently crippling diseases that don’t cause death directly?

(B) Should this technology be used to select against later-in-life diseases that are life threatening at the time or also against mentally or physically crippling diseases that don’t cause death directly? (Would it make a difference if the disease occurred as a child, teenager or adult?)

(C) Should this technology be used to select against non-disease inheritable traits that society finds disadvantageous (use your imagination here)?

(D) Should this technology be used to select for inheritable traits that society finds advantageous (a slightly different question)?

Depending upon your worldview, until recently, answering Questions A through D used to be the purview of God or the random result of chance. Are we ready (and capable) to assume that responsibility? Make your decision as to where you would draw the line then review this short list of famous scientists and see how many on that short list your criteria would permit to be born.

Are you happy with that result? Would you call it good?

It would be nice to get this right since it now appears to be our call to make…