Veil of Ignorance and Unrestricted Abortion

As a Christian, it seems to me that the most logically consistent application of justice is based upon the belief that all human beings bear the image of God, the imago Dei, and as bearers of the image, have equal human dignity, deserving of equal and just treatment by others, both morally and legally, regardless of our varying human attributes (as expounded here at page 163). I realize that not all human beings believe in this God so their systems of justice naturally differ from mine. Resolving conflicting understandings of justice is what makes the intersection of law and bioethics challenging. Currently, nowhere is this conflict so challenging as in the issue of unrestricted, elective abortion.

One such differing theory of justice is by the late John Rawls, in his 1971 Theory of Justice. Briefly, Rawls conceived arriving rationally at a theory of justice by conducting a thought experiment whereby rational persons would determine justice by conceiving it from an “Original Position” behind what he termed a “Veil of Ignorance”. At this Original Position, no one knows what eventual position they would subsequently hold in society, including wealth, health, class, education, minority status, religion and sex/gender. Since justice would be determined prior to one’s random subsequent placement in society, no decision from behind the Veil of Ignorance within the Original Position ought to favor one classification over another because no one would know in advance into what classification one might fall. No one religion would be favored since one might not believe in that religion or any religion at all. No one racial group or sex/gender would be favored since one might not be included in that group or sex/gender.

So what does the Theory of Justice have to say about elective abortion? Interestingly, Rawls himself only wrote once parenthetically on the subject of abortion as it pertained to his theory. It was a very brief footnote in support of abortion, unfortunately not a rigorous defense. As one might expect, different people have used Rawls’s theory to support or refute abortion. I have included links to two such example position papers (RawlsAbortionPro and RawlsAbortionCon). Both of these papers (and others like them) hinge on whether or not one believes the embryo or fetus has sufficient “personhood” or “moral potential”, qualifications that are indeterminate from within the Theory of Justice. Facts are preferred to beliefs when rationalizing from the Original Position behind the Veil of Ignorance, since one does not know in advance what one might believe once subsequently existing in society. Are there any facts that one might use from the Original Position to consider the Rawlsian justice of abortion regardless of one’s beliefs about personhood or moral status of the unborn?

Consider the following: EVERY actual human being invited by Rawls to step with him behind the Veil of Ignorance into the Original Position to determine justice MUST have already passed from conception through the stages of embryo, fetus, newborn infant and immature youth before reaching that nebulous stage of human development called personhood in order to receive the coveted invitation. For the sake of argument, let’s grant that Rawls only wanted the philosopher-kings, IQs above 180, possessors of the apex of personhood, Harvard, not Yale, to join him behind the Veil. Would any of these persons reasoning from the Original Position permit unrestricted, elective abortion of an otherwise healthy unborn human, given that the unborn human aborted might be one of them? The beliefs about the personhood or moral status of any of the earlier stages of development prior to personhood of these great thinkers are irrelevant. What is factually relevant is that all of these great thinkers must each pass through all these stages of development before achieving personhood. None would, from that Original Position, choose unrestricted, elective abortion of themselves to be a just outcome, simply because death has to be the worst of all social categories in which to land after leaving the Original Position. Or is that just my belief?

Treating all humans as equal image bearers of God regardless of any other human characteristics we might possess seems to me a better basis for a theory of justice than one rationally designed by our best and brightest fellow humans. Living that out is the real challenge.

Technical steps to gene-edited babies

This blog has carried several comments about the prospect of heritable human gene editing.  While nearly no one currently supports bringing such babies to birth—and condemns those who would rush ahead to do so—it appears a distinct minority think that we the human race should, if we could, agree never to do such a thing.  The most cautious perspective is to advocate a moratorium.  Others in favor of proceeding argue that, in essence, with the technologic genie (my term, not necessarily theirs) out of the box, a moratorium, much less a ban, is futile; the “rogues” will press ahead, casting off restraint. 

Advocates of research in this area have argued that a clear, careful, regulated pathway is needed to guide the work through necessary laboratory experiments that should be done first, before making a woman pregnant with a gene-edited embryo, in an attempt to be sure that the process is safe and highly likely to yield the intended result.  Even a moratorium would be, by definition, temporary, leaving the question, “when we will know to remove the moratorium?” to be answered.

A feature article in Nature, accessible without a paid subscription, asks “When will the world be ready” for gene-edited babies.  It walks through scientists’ understanding of what the technical issues are.  It is longer than a blog post, so I can only list key points here.  It is worth a reading by anyone interested, and it is written in sufficiently non-technical language that it’s accessible to the general, non-scientist public.

Key concerns are:

  • How would we be sure that genes that were NOT intended to be edited, in fact were not?
  • How would we be sure that genes that ARE intended to be edited are edited correctly?

These two matters have been addressed to some degree, or could be, in animals, but that would be faster and easier than in human egg cells or human embryos, and the results in animals may be different from what is found in the embryos.  (A further question is how many embryos, observed for how long, would need to be studied to support confidence.)

  • Even if the intended gene edit is made, is it clear that doing so is safe and does not induce other health risks? 

This blog recently reported the UK study that suggested that changes in the gene edited in the twin girls born in China last year might eventually reduce life span.  A criterion promulgated in 2017 by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine was that the edited gene should be common in the population and carry no known risk (including, presumably, no increased risk) of disease.  Such knowledge is lacking for human populations, and what is believed known about the association of genes with risk of future disease has often been developed in Western populations, and may not apply to, for example, Africans.

  • At least some embryos would include some edited and some non-edited cells.  It would not easily be possible, if possible at all, to tell how many of which were present, or needed to be for the editing to work and not cause risks to the embryo’s development into a baby and beyond.  And what answers were obtained would require manipulating healthy embryos after in vitro fertilization.  The outcomes could not be predicted from first principles.
  • What should a clinical trial look like?  How many edited children would have to be born, and their health (and, most likely, the health of their progeny) observed for how long to get provisional answers before practicing the technique more widely?  Or, would the work proceed as IVF did—with dissemination in the general public, and no regulated research?

A US and UK committee is planned to address these questions, with the intent of proposing guidelines in 2020.  This will be important to follow, but with no chance to affect.  Most of us will just be watching, which leads to the last concern:

  • Is the world ready?

If that means, is there an international, or even a national, consensus, then the answer is clearly “no.”  That almost certainly remains “no” if one asks whether there is a future prospect for consensus.  It’s hard to envision something other than different groups and nations holding different judgments, and, most likely, remaining in some degree of irresolvable conflict.

Men without chests

One thing that is essential for us to be able to think well about bioethics is an understanding of who we are as human beings. One aspect of that which has been discussed on this forum is the concept of human dignity, the idea that all human beings have inherent value which impacts how we interact with each other ethically. For Christians that is grounded in the idea that we are all created in the image of God. John Kilner has expressed so very well how our being created in the image of God is the reason why people matter.

C. S. Lewis wrote about another aspect of how we understand ourselves as human beings back in 1947 in a little book titled The Abolition of Man. The first chapter of that book is titled “Men without Chests.” As a medieval scholar he was using a medieval image to express a concern that he had about how the tendency to deny the existence of objective moral truth in his day was leading to a problem with how we function as human beings. In the image that he is using the head represents intellect or reason, the chest (or heart) represents sentiments or values, and the stomach represents the appetites or desires. He says that if we believe that statements about morality or values are simply statements about how we feel and are not statements that can be considered objectively true or false, then the chest has lost its ability to mediate between the head and the stomach. Without objective moral values humans become beings whose intellect is used to achieve their desires without any means of controlling those desires.

What Lewis predicted is where much of our society is today. We are told that our identity is based on our desires, and that if we do not fulfill our desires then we are denying who we really are. Anyone who would suggest that our desires might be wrong or that we should not fulfill those desires must hate us and is attacking us and making us unsafe. Our desires define who we are, and our intellect is given the task of fulfilling those desires.

This is in stark contrast with a Christian concept of who we are as human beings. We understand that as human beings we are created by God in his image and with a purpose. We also understand that we are fallen. This world is not how it ought to be and we are not how we ought to be. Because we are fallen, our desires are frequently wrong. Our identity is not found in our desires, but in our relationship with our creator. We understand that our creator has given us the capacity to understand which of our desires are right and which are wrong. He has enabled our intellect to comprehend objective moral values that are grounded in the goodness of God’s nature. Those moral concepts allow us to distinguish right from wrong desires. That is what ethics is about. Those moral concepts also help us understand that we fall short of what we ought to be. We need help. That is what the gospel is all about. That is why Jesus died and rose again as we just celebrated at Easter.

The idea that our desires define who we are and must be fulfilled creates men without chests who are incapable of distinguishing right from wrong and can only express how they feel about a moral issue. We must have chests which hold to objective moral truths to think ethically and be complete human beings who are not simply ruled by our appetites.

Noninvasive prenatal testing and sex-selection abortion

By Steve Phillips

The National Health Service in Great Britain has decided to implement the use of noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) and that has raised some concerns. It would seem natural for there to be concern about this test used to detect prenatal genetic conditions such as Down syndrome, which commonly leads to the choice to abort the fetuses with those conditions. However, according to a recent article in The Conversation by Jeremy Williams one of the major concerns is the use of this technique to facilitate sex-selection abortion. Williams states that one of the major political parties has proposed a policy of banning the use of NIPT for sex determination and has described sex-selective abortion as “incredibly unethical”.

Williams concedes that the idea that sex-selection abortion is morally wrong and ought to be prevented is widely held even by those who otherwise have no moral objection to abortion but suggests that taking that position is problematic for those who believe that a woman has a right to choose to have an abortion. Williams lists several reason that people give for why the sex-selection abortion is wrong. These include idea that sex selection abortions are done due to a trivial preference, concern that sex selection abortion constitutes unjust discrimination against female fetuses, concern about women being coerced into this type of abortion, and that it teaches that the lives of girls are not as important as boys. He is concerned that if these reasons are accepted they would apply more broadly than to just this one type of abortion, and he is right. Many abortions are done for reasons that seem trivial compared to the value of the life of the fetus. Any abortion that is done because of the characteristics of the fetus, including having a genetic disorder such as Down syndrome, are both unjust discrimination against those who have such a disorder and express a message that people who have such a disorder do not have the same value as those who do not. Many women are pressured into having abortions, and do not actually freely choose them.

The problem with what Williams has written is that sex-selection abortion is just clearly wrong. It is wrong to kill a fetus because that fetus is female and end the life of the girl and woman who that fetus would have become just because she is female. That is a clear violation of women’s rights. The fact that this helps us see that abortions in other situations are also clear violations of more universal human rights should make people question whether those abortions are also wrong. It does not mean that sex selection abortion is permissible.

Choosing to die

When people present an argument for the moral permissibility of euthanasia they commonly start with a case in which a person is suffering from a terminal illness and has uncontrolled pain. They say that we should have no moral reason to say that it is wrong to assist those in such a condition who choose to end their life as a means of ending their suffering. This is a combination of two arguments. One is the argument from compassion that says that we have a moral obligation to minimize suffering and that euthanasia should be used if it is the most effective way to eliminate a person’s suffering. The other is the argument from respect for autonomy that says that people should be able to make decisions about their own lives, which should include the decision to end their lives, and that their physicians should respect those decisions. It has been pointed out by many who take the position that euthanasia is wrong that if these are good arguments for the permissibility of euthanasia they should be able to stand on their own. If we take these arguments individually, they lead places we should not want to go.

A couple of weeks ago I wrote about the concerns that many who live with disabilities have regarding the argument from compassion. It says that it can be the right thing to do to end a person’s life when that life is no longer worth living. They are concerned that if they become unable to make their own decisions someone will decide their lives are not worth living and they will be euthanized nonvoluntarily.

A recent case of joint euthanasia by a married couple in their mid-nineties in Canada reported in the Globe and Mail shows what can happen when the argument from respect for autonomy is taken by itself. George and Shirley Brickenden, who had been married for nearly 73 years, choose to die together. They died by lethal injection while lying on their bed holding hands in the presence of their children and clergyman. There was question about whether they both met the criteria of the Canadian law, which requires that the person receiving assisted death be suffering intolerably from a grievous and irremediable condition and that death is reasonably foreseeable. Even though Shirley suffered from long-standing rheumatoid arthritis and heart problems and George had recently begun having fainting spells from a heart rhythm problem, the primary reason for choosing euthanasia was that they did not want one of them to die and leave the other behind.

If the argument from compassion is a reason to accept euthanasia then we must accept nonvoluntary euthanasia in spite of the concerns of those with disabilities. If the argument from respect for autonomy is a reason to accept euthanasia then we must accept euthanasia for any reason given by a rational person including the desire of a married couple not to have one spouse survive longer than the other.

Rather than going to these extremes it seems reasonable to accept that there are limits to the things we ought to do to diminish suffering and there are limits to how far we should go in respecting a person’s autonomy. The intentional killing of an innocent person lies outside those limits.

Euthanasia and those who live with disabilities

This week the students in the medical ethics class that I teach are looking at the issue of euthanasia and physician assisted suicide. An article in The Catholic Register reminded me of the important role that people with disabilities have played in the public discussion of euthanasia. The article discusses the concerns that Taylor Hyatt, policy analyst and outreach coordinator for the disability rights group Not Dead Yet, has expressed about assisted suicide in Canada. She is concerned about proposals being considered to expand the Canadian Medical Aid in Dying (MAiD) law “to include mature minors, allow advanced directives for those with a dementia diagnosis, and allow MAiD for those with psychological suffering without the necessity of death being reasonably foreseeable.” She also expressed concern that under the present law no one is looking to see if those seeking assisted death have unmet accessibility needs that are pressuring them to end their lives.

From the earliest discussions about legalizing physician assisted suicide in the US, disability rights groups have played a significant role. They recognize that with any form of euthanasia the physician who chooses to assist in causing another person’s death must agree that the person’s life is not worth living. If we say that it is ever permissible for one person to say that another person’s life is not worth living, then it opens the door to people thinking that a the life of a person with disability is not worth living and that it would be best if that person’s life would be ended. Thus, even fully voluntary euthanasia puts those who are disabled at risk for nonvoluntary euthanasia. Actually many more than those with disabilities are at risk, but the marginalization that they experience makes them more sensitive to the risk.

We should listen to them.

Citizenship, Surrogacy and the Power of ART

A recent LA Times article by Alene Tchekmedyian explores a complicated case involving birthright citizenship, surrogacy and same-sex marriage. Briefly, a California man, Andrew Banks, married an Israeli man, Elad Dvash, in 2010. At the time, same-sex marriage was not legal in the US leaving Elad unable to acquire a green card for residency (via the marriage) so the couple moved to Canada where Andrew has dual citizenship. While in Canada, the couple conceived twin boys, Aiden and Ethan, using assisted reproduction technology (ART) whereby eggs from an anonymous donor were fertilized by sperm from Elad and Andrew and then implanted within the womb of a female surrogate and carried to term. When the US Supreme Court struck down the federal law that denied benefits to legally married gay couples in 2013, Elad applied for and was granted his greed card. The present controversy occurred when Andrew and Elad applied for US passports for the twins. US State Department officials required detailed explanation of the boys’ conception, eventually requiring DNA tests which confirmed Aiden to be the biological son of Andrew and Ethan to be the biological son of Elad. Aiden was granted a US passport while Ethan was denied. The family has since traveled to the US (Elad with his green card and Ethan with his Canadian passport and temporary 6 month visa) where they are now suing the State Department for Ethan’s US birthright citizenship. They are arguing that the current applicable statute places them wrongly in the category of children born out of wedlock rather than recognizing their marriage, thus discriminating against them as a binational LGBTQ couple.

Birthright citizenship is a complicated legal arena and I am no lawyer. The US is even more complicated because we allow birthright citizenship to be conferred jus soli (right of the soil) in addition to jus sanguinis (right of blood). The twins were not born in the US so establishing “bloodline” is needed. The law specifies conditions where one parent is a US citizen and one is not a US citizen, and there is further differentiation depending on whether the children of the US citizen were born in or out of wedlock. They also vary depending on whether the US citizen is male or female, with the law more lenient (easier to acquire citizenship) for the child of a woman than of a man.

While the legal challenge here will almost certainly involve potential issues of discrimination of LGBTQ binational couples, the problem is really with the current legal definitions of parent as it relates to surrogacy in general. The State Department actually has a website dedicated answering questions related to foreign surrogacy and citizenship. The real issue is that the State Department relies upon genetic proof of parentage for foreign surrogacy births. In the present case, the surrogacy occurred outside the US, Elad is the genetic father of Ethan and Elad is not a US citizen; therefore Ethan is not a US citizen. While I’m deep in the weeds here, technically, Aiden and Ethan are not fraternal twins in the usual sense but rather half siblings (and this assumes that the donor eggs are from the same woman; otherwise the boys would be unrelated despite sharing the same pregnant womb through the magic of ART). Had Ethan been physically born via surrogacy in the US, he would have acquired his citizenship via jus soli (see US map for surrogacy friendly states near you).

This problem is just as confounding for heterosexual couples using foreign surrogates, and the problem is global. A more detailed technical legal discussion may be found here. A heterosexual couple using donor eggs and donor sperm and using a foreign third party surrogate would have exactly the same problem establishing US citizenship for “their” child. A similar problem would exist for an adopted embryo gestated in a foreign country by a foreign surrogate. If either the egg or the sperm of the US citizen is used for the surrogate birth, the child would be granted birthright citizenship.

The main difference for homosexual couples is that only one spouse can presently be the biological parent. I say “presently” because with ART it is theoretically possible (and may become actually possible in the future) to convert a human somatic cell into either a male sperm or a female egg. At that point, both spouses within a same-sex marriage could be the biological parents of their child. The present legal issue is not the result of a cultural prejudice against anyone’s sexuality but with the biological prejudice of sex itself. ART has the potential ability to blur the categories of sex as culture is now blurring the categories of gender. Should we consider this a good thing?

Given the present technological limits of ART, the simple issue of US citizenship could be resolved in all these cases if the US citizen parent simply adopted the child. Elad correctly points out that while adoption of Ethan by Andrew would grant Ethan US citizenship, it would not grant Ethan birthright citizenship, a necessary requirement for Ethan to someday run for US president. ART may be forcing us to look at changing our definition of parent but should it change our definition of biology? Ethan is the biological son of Elad. He is able to be the legally adopted son of Andrew and enjoy the benefits of US citizenship as currently does his half brother Aiden. He is not able to become the biological son of Andrew and enjoy the additional benefit of birthright citizenship via jus sanguinis.

Should we change the definition of birthright citizenship because ART is changing our definition of parent?

Distorted views of the human person

After writing about how the events of the first Christmas influence how we think about personhood I read something that made me realize how distorted some of the views of personhood are in our society. I was reading an essay by James Toomey in the Hastings Center Bioethics Forum titled “Is Noninvasive Prenatal Genetic Testing Eugenic?” Toomey was responding to an earlier article by Vardit Ravitsky in which Ravitsky draws on a disability rights argument to say that the promotion of widespread prenatal testing and abortion as a means of reducing the societal burden of genetic disease is morally problematic and a form of eugenics in its negative sense. Toomey says that Ravitsky’s concern is not valid.

Setting aside the moral concerns about abortion done for any reason, the thing that struck me was one of Toomey’s arguments. He says that reducing the number of people with genetic disorders by prenatal testing and abortion “is closer to a cure than an assault on personhood.” He says that “narrative or social identity is what we care about when we think about personhood.” Therefore, if a couple plans to have a child, conceives, discovers the child will have Down syndrome, aborts the child, and then conceives again and gives birth to a child without Down syndrome, he says this can be seen as involving a single person who has been cured of Down syndrome. He claims this removes the eugenic associations from prenatal testing to reduce the number of people in society with a disorder such as Down syndrome.

Saying that the two children in this scenario, one aborted and one brought to birth, can be considered one child even though they are genetically distinct and conceived at different times is a serious problem with this view of personhood. We live in a time in which people believe at once the contradictory ideas that the only things that are real and knowable are those things that are material and empirically verifiable and that human persons are completely nonmaterial entities defined by narrative and social identity. The latter leads to this bizarre idea that these two distinct children, one dead and one living, are one person. The first leads to other problems.

It turns out that this is another place in which our understanding of Jesus can help us understand who we are as human beings. The early church had to deal with heresies that said that Jesus was either physically real but not divine or divine but not a physical being. The early creeds addressed these ideas by asserting the biblical truth that Jesus was both a physical and spiritual being who was at the same time fully human and fully divine. In a similar way human beings are composed of intimately connected material and immaterial aspects of who we are. Denying either of those aspects of our being leads to great misunderstanding of who we are. Not understanding who we are leads to poor ethical judgments.

Racial inequalities in cancer survival

Three studies published in a supplemental issue of the journal Cancer this month come to disturbing conclusions: in the United States, the survival rates for colon, breast, and ovarian cancer are lower for black people than for white people.

The news isn’t all bad: overall cancer survival rates are going up. The three studies mentioned here draw from two larger studies of worldwide cancer survival, the CONCORD study, published in 2008, and the CONCORD-2 study, published in 2015. Between CONCORD and CONCORD-2, cancer survival increased across all groups. But in both studies, the survival of black people in the United States lagged behind that for white people by about 10%.

Now there are certainly many reasons for the difference. Black people may be getting diagnosed with cancer at later stages, when survival is lower. There may be differences between the two groups, like genetic factors or the presence of other illnesses, that cause the cancers to be more aggressive in blacks. Mistrust of the health care system is more common among black patients, so they may be less likely to access care or access it early enough.

But other reasons include socio-economic status and access to health care; those who can’t access medical care because they can’t afford it or because it is not available nearby are less likely to receive necessary screening and treatment. And most troubling is the “consistent finding that black women do not receive guidelines-based treatment compared with white women, even when treated within the same hospital.”

The situation is too complex for simplistic answers; one can’t say from these studies that doctors are individually practicing blatant racism, and there is after all such a thing as systemic racism. But the medical profession should take such findings seriously, and seek every available avenue of education and self-monitoring to ensure that of all the places people encounter racism, the health care system is not one of them. And Christians especially, who believe that God created all people with equal dignity because all of us are created in His image, should work towards a health care system where the value — or length — of one’s life does not vary based solely on the color of one’s skin.

Gender-Optional Birth Certifcates: A Parental Lesson

I’ve been parenting for over fourteen years now, and I’d think it should offer some seasoning and an accumulation of wisdom. Yet the parental “goalposts” are continually being moved as my own children grow into young adults, and (to throw in another metaphor) I enter uncharted waters every day. Current parenting choices are often met with rejoinders by myself and others, and regrets mount over past choices. Cheerfully, based on reports from those who preceded me, I find that it’s entirely expected. Parenting means making mistakes. And as my older children enter high school, I catch myself living vicariously through their triumphs, joys, and agonies. The tension is great to give them space to be their own people, not enlightened versions of me that will triumph over that which I never could. But it’s a struggle.

At the same time, and I don’t know if it’s advancing age or a sign of our times, I think I appreciate the satirical more now than ever. It seems that, if we can laugh about ourselves, we may be able to put our differences in perspective and not take ourselves quite so seriously. Sometimes “hard news” even reads like satire. It has been a few months now, but I thought that a friend who linked me to an article in the Canadian Broadcasting Company’s story was sharing a satirical piece. He was not.

My high school English teacher would read the pronouns and capitalization choices in that piece as an aneurism-inducing affront to all she held dear. I’m not sure I’ll be able to comment without upsetting her, me, and many others, in grammatical terms alone. In short, a transgender Canadian, Kori Doty, fought to keep the gender identification on their (grammatical groan) child, Searyl Atli, unspecified, stipulating that the child would not…and should not be expected to…have fully formed a gender identity until later in life. Gender identity is fluid, and a birth certificate should recognize that. According to Kori’s attorney, “assigning gender at birth is a violation of a child’s human rights to freely express their gender identity.” Cis-entitlement is not a satirical construct, but a point of great contention and injustice, and the violation of a basic human right, to those included in this piece.

A few months of pondering later, as a parent I can, in some ways, relate to Kori, who is making a choice with which I disagree, with some sympathy. Kori wants baby Searyl to be empowered to overcome the pain that gender identity struggles have already been lived in their life. Yes, there is also a clear political agenda, in the creation of a human right that society has never recognized, and I have far less respect for that. But I know the evangelical church has a history of poor responses to issues of sexual identity, on a political and relational level. I have limited personal experience with transgender individuals, and recognize that ethical decisions are not best made anecdotally, but even that limited experience has revealed that they have complex and challenging, and often extraordinarily painful, life stories. None have seemed capricious in their decisions. Some have been born with undetermined genitalia that truly weren’t clearly determinative of their gender. Others struggled with the very essence of who they were, even as anatomy would have seemed determinative.

The complexity of this issue should be sobering to us all, and particularly to those who embrace the Christian message that fully recognizes the devastation of a fallen world and the remarkable promise of grace that is not yet fully realized. I encourage the church to look at a complex issue with cautious, winsome eyes. The evangelical church lost its place at the table on the discussions of homosexuality (one where its voice could and should have been compelling) because too many showed graceless insensitivity. The high suicide rate of those who identify as transgender should be heartbreaking to the church. I am convicted as I initially read the article as unintentional satire.

Yet this is another issue where the complexity of medicine and social science is subordinated to a cultural agenda. There is, frankly, nothing wrong with asking for time and space to better study and understand the many pieces of the puzzle that transgenderism includes. The cry to “affirm” that which I can’t yet understand is unreasonable, even in the name of compassion. The appeal of bioethics is the way it synthesizes the disciplines of medicine, social science, theology, philosophy, and public policy, and recognizes the importance of each. I would like to think parents are the best arbiters of their children’s interests. Sadly, this story, and my own vicarious desires for my children, remind me otherwise. This parent has instrumentalized a child. The choice, if repeated on a mass scale, leads to social chaos and places a staggering stress on children whose developmental biology already faces challenges in our culture. Even now, we see gender reassignment surgery performed on young people. A sobering piece from a bit ago in The Federalist likens these surgeries with the frontal lobotomies of the 1930’s. Medicine needs to be exceedingly cautious as it encounters the “human right” that is gender identity. May bioethicists recognize the great complexity of transgenderism through eyes of compassion and grace, yet not submit medical and ethical wisdom to a cultural agenda. And may parents be wise enough to realize when we place the burdens of our agendas upon our children, whatever those agendas may be.