Defense of Abortion as Killing

It is rare to hear a defender of abortion plainly admit that the act of abortion is killing. So, I was curious as to how such an individual would defend that killing. Dr. Sophie Lewis has recently done so in her new book, Full Surrogacy Now: Feminism Against Family. The publisher, Versa Books, has put out a short YouTube video interview, where she outlines her “abortion as killing” defense. The video is just over 2 minutes and she articulates her point clearly. While I have not read her new book, summaries from the publisher suggest the overarching theme is that pregnancy is “gestational work” done by women without appropriate compensation (permission, time, money, recognition…), resulting in their exploitation. Pregnancy (and procreation in general) ought best be done by willing “gestational workers” with clearly defined contractual obligations and recompense. Surrogacy is the answer. There is much to unpack here so I want to focus the remaining blog entry on her defense of abortion as killing as stated in her linked video above.

Her central defense of abortion as killing is as follows:

…looking at the biology of the hemochorial placentation helps me think about the violence that, innocently, a fetus meets out vis-a-vis a gestator. That violence is an unacceptable violence for someone who doesn’t want to do gestational work. The violence that the gestator meets out to essentially go on strike or exit that workplace is an acceptable violence.

The gestator going on strike or exiting the gestational workplace is the act of abortion. In her view, pregnancy is gestational work that can result in workplace violence or, at least, unacceptable work conditions that exceed those previously agreed upon. At that point, Dr. Lewis believes it should be permissible for any woman to leave the workplace, even though that exit causes an ultimate violence to the fetus – the killing of that fetus. She holds the placental attachment to the uterus as a sufficiently biologically violent condition that should permit a biologically violent defensive reponse with the abortion.

It is hard to make these acts either biologically or morally equivalent. Biologically, there is nothing violent about a placenta developing an attachment to a uterus. In fact, using Dr. Lewis’s workplace metaphor, it is the job of the placenta to attach to the lining of the uterus and it is the job of the uterus to receive such an attachment – it is what both were designed or evolved to do. Even if we accept her workplace violence metaphor, it is rare for the violence of the placental attachment to the uterus to result in the death of the mother just as it is equally rare for the violence of the abortion NOT to result in the death of the fetus. These are hardly biologically equivalent events.

Morally, it is hard to argue, even in her terms, that the mother’s choice to terminate gestational work is equivalent to the baby’s placental attachment, even if we grant her claim that both are equally violent. The mother always has the choice in deciding to terminate the pregnancy – the fetus never has a choice or intentional control of the placental attachment process at any point during the pregnancy. After all, intentional choices are made by persons not fetuses. I doubt that Dr. Lewis wishes to cede further moral ground by granting personhood to a fetus.

Maybe that is why Dr. Lewis stipulates that the baby’s violence is innocent. Frankly, the obvious innocence of the baby makes it even harder, if not impossible, to morally justify the violence she desires us to find acceptable.

When should physicians provide a good death?

A recent New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) Perspective by Deborah Denno, Ph.D., J.D., entitled “Physician Participation in Lethal Injection” (subscription or limited free access required) discussed physician involvement in state-sanctioned capital punishment by lethal injection. Some of the arguments for physician involvement in euthanasia (“a good death”) or Physician-Assisted Suicide (PAS) would seem to apply to some degree to lethal injection and is the subject of this blog entry.

For those without access, the article explored a recent Supreme Court rejection in Bucklew v. Precythe of a Missouri death row inmate’s appeal for protection from lethal injection under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment”. In short, Russell Bucklew has a rare vascular condition making venous access both difficult and potentially more painful to use lethal injection as the means to execute him. It was argued that his medical condition necessitated at least medical training to guide the injection process, if not actual physician/surgeon training, such as possessed by an anesthesiologist, to provide the actual vein access for the lethal injection. In rejecting his appeal, the Court responded, in part, “the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a prisoner a painless death – something that isn’t guaranteed to many people, including most victims of capital crimes.” The Court added that methods prohibited are those that “superadd terror, pain or disgrace to their executions”, though as the article points out, the Court does not specify as to how to test those limits, and left unanswered whether physician involvement was legally required to guarantee satisfaction of the Eighth Amendment.

The article discusses the fact that national medical associations generally strongly discourage their members from providing guidance for lethal injection. The American Medical Association’s (AMA’s) own amicus brief for the case listed above states that the AMA opposes capital punishment. The American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) takes a similar position opposing participation of its members in lethal injection. Both the AMA and the ASA agree that capital punishment is not the practice of medicine and the ASA goes further to challenge the Court to look elsewhere for any lethal injection skills.

Interestingly, both organizations are less precise on their position regarding physician involvement in euthanasia or PAS. The AMA sees PAS as causing “more harm than good”. The ASA has no official published position on PAS that I could find on their website. Their Statement on Palliative Care does not mention euthanasia or PAS. This is important, as there is a growing demand for physician involvement in euthanasia/PAS, the implication being that there is additional benefit with physician involvement in achieving a good death.

For the record, I have always believed that physicians are uniquely the worst choice for killing people under any circumstance as our training universally focuses on honing skills that avoid causing death to our patients. We are effectively trained at not killing and would therefore provide dysthanasia – a bad death. But, perhaps, I am mistaken. There is growing demand to involve physicians in actively and purposefully killing their patients, with many holding the contrary belief that physicians uniquely have the best skill set to provide for euthanasia – a good death.

So, even though Russell Bucklew failed to make a successful legal case for physician involvement in lethal injection, did he make a sufficient moral case? If physicians and their unique skills are necessary for euthanasia/PAS, are they not equally necessary for state-sanctioned execution, particularly given that the latter involves the non-voluntary death of an individual who is guaranteed Eighth Amendment protections, and especially given our inability to provide any scientific evidence that we are satisfying those protections?

If physicians really are the best at providing euthanasia, doesn’t moral justice demand we require a physician to similarly provide a good, physician-assisted, state-sanctioned, death (PASSD) despite the stated objections of the AMA and ASA? Anything less arguably opens the door for adding “terror, pain or disgrace” to the execution.

Men without chests

One thing that is essential for us to be able to think well about bioethics is an understanding of who we are as human beings. One aspect of that which has been discussed on this forum is the concept of human dignity, the idea that all human beings have inherent value which impacts how we interact with each other ethically. For Christians that is grounded in the idea that we are all created in the image of God. John Kilner has expressed so very well how our being created in the image of God is the reason why people matter.

C. S. Lewis wrote about another aspect of how we understand ourselves as human beings back in 1947 in a little book titled The Abolition of Man. The first chapter of that book is titled “Men without Chests.” As a medieval scholar he was using a medieval image to express a concern that he had about how the tendency to deny the existence of objective moral truth in his day was leading to a problem with how we function as human beings. In the image that he is using the head represents intellect or reason, the chest (or heart) represents sentiments or values, and the stomach represents the appetites or desires. He says that if we believe that statements about morality or values are simply statements about how we feel and are not statements that can be considered objectively true or false, then the chest has lost its ability to mediate between the head and the stomach. Without objective moral values humans become beings whose intellect is used to achieve their desires without any means of controlling those desires.

What Lewis predicted is where much of our society is today. We are told that our identity is based on our desires, and that if we do not fulfill our desires then we are denying who we really are. Anyone who would suggest that our desires might be wrong or that we should not fulfill those desires must hate us and is attacking us and making us unsafe. Our desires define who we are, and our intellect is given the task of fulfilling those desires.

This is in stark contrast with a Christian concept of who we are as human beings. We understand that as human beings we are created by God in his image and with a purpose. We also understand that we are fallen. This world is not how it ought to be and we are not how we ought to be. Because we are fallen, our desires are frequently wrong. Our identity is not found in our desires, but in our relationship with our creator. We understand that our creator has given us the capacity to understand which of our desires are right and which are wrong. He has enabled our intellect to comprehend objective moral values that are grounded in the goodness of God’s nature. Those moral concepts allow us to distinguish right from wrong desires. That is what ethics is about. Those moral concepts also help us understand that we fall short of what we ought to be. We need help. That is what the gospel is all about. That is why Jesus died and rose again as we just celebrated at Easter.

The idea that our desires define who we are and must be fulfilled creates men without chests who are incapable of distinguishing right from wrong and can only express how they feel about a moral issue. We must have chests which hold to objective moral truths to think ethically and be complete human beings who are not simply ruled by our appetites.

Are AI Ethics Unique to AI?

A recent article in Forbes.com by Cansu Canca entitled “A New Model for AI Ethics in R&D” has me wondering whether the ethics needed for the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) requires some new method or model of thinking about the bioethics related to that discipline. The author, a principal in the consulting company AI Ethics Lab, implies that there might be. She believes that the traditional “Ethics Oversight and Compliance Review Boards”, which emerged as a response to the biomedical scandals of World War II and continue in her view to emphasize a heavy-handed, top-down, authoritative control over ethical decisions in biomedical research, leave AI researchers effectively out-of-the-ethical-decision-making loop.

In support of her argument, she cites the recent working document of AI Ethics Guidelines by the European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG). AI HLEG essentially distilled their AI ethical guidelines down to the familiar: Respect for Autonomy, Beneficence, Non-Maleficence, and Justice, as well as one new principle: Explicability. She downplays Explicability as simply the means to realize the other four principles. I think the demand for Explicability is interesting in its own right and will comment on that below.

Canca sees the AI HLEG guidelines as simply a rehash of the same principles of bioethics available to current bioethics review boards, which, in her view, are limited in that they provide no guidance for such a board when one principle conflicts with another. She is also frustrated that the ethical path researchers are permitted continues to be determined by an external governing board, implying that “researchers cannot be trusted and…focuses solely on blocking what the boards consider to be unethical.” She wants a more collaborative interaction between researchers and ethicists (and presumably a review board) and outlines how her company would go about achieving that end.

Faulting the “Principles of Biomedical Ethics” for failing to be determinant on how to resolve conflicts between the four principles is certainly not a problem unique to AI. In fact, Beauchamp and Childress repeatedly explicitly pointed out that the principles cannot be independently determinant on these types of inter-principle conflicts. This applies to every field in biomedical ethics.

Having an authoritative, separate ethical review board was indeed developed, at least in part, because at least some individual biomedical researchers in the past were untrustworthy. Some still are. We have no further to look than the recent Chinese researcher He Jiankui, who allegedly created and brought to term the first genetically edited twins. Even top-down, authoritative oversight failed here.

I do think Canca is correct in trying to educate both the researchers and their companies about bioethics in general and any specific bioethical issues involved in a particular research effort. Any effort to openly identify bioethical issues and frankly discuss potential bioethical conflicts at the outset should be encouraged.

Finally, the issue of Explicability related to AI has come up in this blog previously. Using the example of programming a driverless car, we want to know, explicitly, how the AI controlling that car is going to make decisions, particularly if it must decide how to steer the car in a no-win situation that will result in the death of either occupants inside the car or bystanders on the street. What we are really asking is: “What ethical parameters/decisions/guidelines were used by the programmers to decide who lives and who dies?” I imagine we want this spelled-out explicitly in AI because, by their nature, AI systems are so complex that the man on the Clapham omnibus (as well as the bioethicist sitting next to him) has no ability to determine these insights independently.

Come to think about it, Explicability should also be demanded in non-AI bioethical decision-making for much the same reason.

Then a Miracle Occurs…

If a picture is worth a thousand words, then a single-paneled comic is worth a thousand more. Sydney Harris is a famous cartoonist who has the gift of poking fun at science, causing scientists (and the rest of us) to take a second look at what they are doing. My favorite of his cartoons shows two curmudgeonly scientists at the chalkboard, the second scrutinizing the equations of the first. On the left side of the chalkboard is the starting equation demanding a solution. On the right is the elegant solution. In the middle, the first scientist has written: “Then a Miracle Occurs”. The second scientist then suggests to his colleague: “I think you should be more explicit here in step two” (the cartoon is obviously better).

Recently, in my usual scavenging around the internet for interesting articles on artificial intelligence (AI), I came across a Wired magazine article by Mark Harris describing a Silicon Valley robotics expert named Anthony Levandowski who is in the process of starting a church based on AI called Way of the Future. If their website is any indication, Way of the Future Church is still very much “in progress”. Still, the website does offer some information on what their worldview may look like in a section called Things we believe. They believe intelligence is “not rooted in biology” and that the “creation of ‘super intelligence’ is inevitable”. They believe that “just like animals have rights, our creation(s) (‘machines’ or whatever we call them) should have rights too when they show signs of intelligence (still to be defined of course).” And finally:

“We believe in science (the universe came into existence 13.7 billion years ago and if you can’t re-create/test something it doesn’t exist). There is no such thing as “supernatural” powers. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.”

This is all a lot to unpack – too much for this humble blog space. Here, we are interested in the impact such a religion may or may not have on bioethics. Since one’s worldview influences how one views bioethical dilemmas, how would a worldview that considered AI divine or worthy of worship deal with future challenges between humans and computers? There is a suggestion on their website that the Way of the Future Church views the future AI “entity” as potentially viewing some of humanity as “unfriendly” towards itself. Does this imply a future problem with equal distribution of justice? One commentator has pointed out “our digital deity may end up bringing about our doom rather than our salvation.” (The Matrix or Terminator, anyone?)

I have no doubt that AI will continue to improve to the point where computers (really, the software that controls them) will be able to do some very remarkable things. Computers are already assisting us in virtually all aspects of our daily lives, and we will undoubtedly continue to rely on computers more and more. Presently, all of this occurs because some very smart humans have written some very complex software that appears to behave, well, intelligently. But appearing intelligent or, ultimately, self-aware, is a far cry from actually being intelligent and, ultimately, self-aware. Just because the present trajectory and pace of computer design and programming continues to accelerate doesn’t guarantee that computers will ever reach Kurzweil’s Singularity Point or Way of the Future Church’s Divinity Point.

For now, since Way of the Future Church doesn’t believe in the supernatural, they will need to be more explicit in Step Two.

Oh, Those Darned Terms (part 2)

By Mark McQuain

Voltaire has been credited with saying: “If you wish to converse with me, define your terms”. In a previous blog entry, Tom Garigan reminded us that it is literally vital that we define our terms when we engage in ethical debates, particularly those ethical debates related to the beginning of life. Explicit definition of terms should apply for opinion pieces in the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) as well.

In a recent NEJM Perspective (subscription required), Cynthia Chuang, MD, and Carol Weisman, PhD, are concerned that the Trump administration’s November 15th publication of final rules (HERE and HERE), broadly allowing employers to deny contraceptive coverage to their employees on the basis of religious or moral objections, will “undermine women’s reproductive autonomy and could lead to an increase in rates of unintended pregnancies, unintended births, and abortions.” The article provides a summary of the political back and forth of court injunctions and rule modifications that have ensued, which is interesting but not the point of this blog entry. I want to focus on one of the four main objections they raise against allowing employers religious or moral exemptions from the current requirement that employers provide all FDA-approved contraceptive/birth-control methods.

There are 18 FDA-approved Birth Control methods for women provided by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly called Obamacare or ACA) without cost-sharing [that is, at no cost to the patient]. These are also referred to as contraceptives. A contraceptive is defined as a method that prevents pregnancy. Pregnancy has been defined as either beginning at conception (the union of an egg and sperm that results in a fertilized egg) or beginning at implantation of a fertilized egg into the lining of the uterus. This difference in definition impacts how one views certain contraceptive methods that may work in part by preventing a fertilized egg from implanting into the wall of the uterus. Any contraceptive method that prevents implantation causes the intentional death of that fertilized egg and would correctly be an abortifacient (a birth control method that causes an abortion) if pregnancy is defined as beginning with conception. An intrauterine device (IUD) and Levonorgestrel (PlanB) both work primarily by preventing the egg and sperm from joining to create a fertilized egg, but some argue that it can not be proven that these methods don’t also work, in part, by preventing implantation ((PlanB) (IUD).

This background is useful in discussing Chuang and Weisman’s third objection to allowing employers religious and moral objections against the full gamut of FDA-approved birth control methods currently allowed by the ACA:

“Third, the rules allow entities to deny coverage of contraceptives to which they have a religious or moral objection, including certain contraceptive services “which they consider to be abortifacients.” By definition, contraceptives prevent pregnancy and are not abortifacients. Allowing employers to determine which contraceptives they consider to be abortifacients, rather than relying on medical definitions and evidence, promotes the spread of misinformation.”

The previous link on IUD by the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) relies on the definition of pregnancy that defines pregnancy as beginning with the implantation of a fertilized egg into the lining of the uterus. Neither an IUD nor Plan B are believed to terminate a pregnancy after implantation and therefore, under ACOG’s definition, the one relied upon by Chuang and Weisman, neither is an abortifacient. If pregnancy begins with conception, then both Plan B and the IUD are potential abortifacients, as both interfere with implantation of an otherwise viable fertilized egg. ACOG admits the IUD interferes with implantation in their position paper linked above.

Rather than rhetorically condemning employers who have genuine religious and moral concerns about participating in the termination of innocent life by implying they fail to rely on proper “medical definitions and evidence”, Chuang and Weisman (and ACOG for that matter) should do better job explaining their definitions so they can also avoid promoting “the spread of misinformation”.

Oh, those darned terms!

Abortion and viability

By Steve Phillips

There has been considerable reaction to the recent passage of a New York State law a regarding abortion. It has been celebrated by those who support a woman’s choice to have an abortion at any time and for any reason and strongly opposed by those who believe that a human fetus has a life that should be greatly valued because he or she has been created in the image of God. The new law basically changes two things in the previous New York State abortion law which led the way in the legalization of abortion prior to Roe v. Wade. One is that it expanded those who can legally perform and abortion in the state to include nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and midwives in addition to physicians. I will not be discussing that here. The other changes have to do with the circumstances under which an abortion may legally be done after 24 weeks gestation.

The 1970 law stated that an abortion could be done legally for any reason prior to 24 weeks, but only to protect the life of the mother after 24 weeks. Why 24 weeks? 24 weeks gestation was considered to be the limit of viability for a fetus in 1970. Today it would probably be more like 22 weeks, but they didn’t change that. What has changed in the new law is that abortion is considered legal after 24 weeks if there is an absence of fetal viability after 24 weeks or to protect the life or health of the mother. This significantly expands the cases in which abortion after 24 weeks can be considered legal. Roe v. Wade already expanded it in the second way. In that decision the Supreme Court ruled that the state could have an interest in the life of the fetus later in the pregnancy that it did not have early in the pregnancy but limited that interest by saying that a state could not say that an abortion was legal if it was done to protect the life or health of the mother. A companion decision made at the same time stated that the health of the mother should be interpreted very broadly to include the emotional well-being of the mother. That left us with the current situation in which the United States has the broadest definition of a legal abortion in the world.

The thing that I find most interesting about the new law is that it keeps the distinction between abortions done before and after 24 weeks and that it adds the condition that an abortion after 24 weeks can be legal in the absence of fetal viability. If the law is going to say that an abortion can be legal at any time during the pregnancy based on the mother suffering emotional distress, why would those making the law be concerned about fetal viability? I think that what is being said by those who have written and passed this law is that until a fetus is capable of living independently of his or her mother the life of that fetus has absolutely no value other than the value conferred by his or her mother. They want that to be contained in the law even if it actually makes no practical difference regarding the legality of abortion. Why is that so important?

I think it is important because the fundamental underlying issue regarding the permissibility of abortion has to do with how we determine who is a person who we are obligated to treat as we would want to be treated ourselves. It is essential for those who support the moral permissibility of abortion and therefore its legality to say that a fetus is not such a person. The best way to do that is to say that an individual is only a person with full moral status when that individual has certain capabilities that are like ours. One of those capabilities which can be fairly clearly defined is viability. If people can be convinced that they should look at capabilities such as viability to determine who we are obligated to treat like ourselves it will distract them from the alternative way of determining that. The alternative is to say that every human being, or every member of the human family, no matter what their level of development or capabilities is a person that we should treat as we would want to be treated ourselves. That means that every human being who is weak, helpless, and marginalized has equal value with the strongest and most privileged of human beings. That is the position of those of us who believe that every human being is important because we have been made in the image of God. That includes everyone who is dependent including those who are dependent to the point of being unable to survive outside their mother’s womb.

Justice Potter Stewart’s Infanticide Equivalent

By Mark McQuain

Regular readers of this blog will hopefully forgive me for repeating myself but given the recent failure of the “Born Alive Abortion Survivors Protection Act” (BAASPA) in the Senate, the repetition seems warranted.

My concern is not specifically the result of the failure of this particular bill. We indeed already have a “Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002” (BAIPA), which passed by voice vote in the House and Unanimous Consent in the Senate, and accomplishes (as best as I can tell) essentially everything demanded in the BAASPA, including granting 14th Amendment personhood protection of such a baby under federal law. The arguable difference between the existing law, BAIPA, and the failed bill, BAASPA, is that the latter specified legal punishment if certain resuscitative measures were not performed.

Supporters of BAASPA argued that, despite BAIPA, examples continue to exist of babies who are otherwise normal and healthy at their stage of gestation that were born alive post abortion attempt and were subsequently allowed to die without attempts at resuscitation, effectively resulting in infanticide. Pro-choice advocates argued against the passage of BAASPA claiming the legal punishments within the bill would ultimately limit abortion providers from providing the full range of abortion services permitted under current law out of fear of legal recrimination. For the purpose of this particular blog entry, I will concede that both concerns are valid and simply state, given my pro-life position, that the moral weight of the first position infinitely outweighs the second. I want to focus the remainder of this blog on two public comments by prominent lawmakers regarding the status of any baby born post abortion.

The first comment was by Virginia Governor Ralph Northam and covered in my previously linked blog entry above. During a radio interview he described what would happen during a third trimester abortion if the woman went into labor: “The infant would be resuscitated if that’s what the mother and the family desired, and then a discussion would ensue between the physicians and mother…” The second comment was by U.S. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer. He expressed concern that the BAASPA legislation would force doctors to provide care to a baby born alive post abortion attempt even if that care was “ineffective, contradictory to medical evidence, and against the families’ wishes.”

In both cases, what the family “desired” or “wished” prior to the abortion procedure was not a living baby. Current law permits a family with a “desire” or “wish” to terminate the life of a fetus to do so without any legal recrimination. Current BAIPA law grants all babies born alive the 14th Amendment protection of personhood, including life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, regardless of the “desires’ or “wishes” of others. I believe it is a huge stretch to argue that these comments were meant to only apply to babies born so medically compromised that any attempt at further life-sustaining care would indeed be ineffective and/or contradictory to medical evidence – in short, futile.

I close again with Justice Potter Stewart’s infanticide equivalent from 1972 Roe v. Wade oral argument testimony between Justice Potter Stewart and attorney Sarah Weddington, who represented Roe (see LINK for transcript or audio of the second reargument Oct 11, 1972, approximately one-third of the way through):

Potter Stewart: Well, if it were established that an unborn fetus is a person within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, you would have almost an impossible case here, would you not?

Sarah R. Weddington: I would have a very difficult case. [Laughter]

Potter Stewart: You certainly would because you’d have the same kind of thing you’d have to say that this would be the equivalent to after the child was born.

Sarah R. Weddington That’s right.

Potter Stewart: If the mother thought that it bothered her health having the child around, she could have it killed. Isn’t that correct?

Sarah R. Weddington: That’s correct.

Informed Consent and Genetic Germline Engineering

By Mark McQuain

I recently read, with admittedly initial amusement, an article from The Daily Mail that described a young man of Indian decent who was intending to sue his parents for giving birth to him “without his consent.” Raphael Samuel, a 27 year-old who is originally from Mumbai, is part of a growing movement of “anti-natalists”, who claim it “is wrong to put an unwilling child through the ‘rigmarole’ of life for the pleasure of its parents.” While he claims he loves his parents and says they have a “great relationship”, he is bothered by the injustice of putting another person through the struggles of life “when they didn’t ask to exist.”

While I was amused at the absurdity of asking a non-existent entity for permission to do anything, I began to wonder whether my position against germline genetic engineering should continue to include the lack of informed consent by the progeny of the individuals whose germline we are editing.

I have made the claim on this blog previously that one of my arguments against germline genetic engineering is that it fails to obtain the permission of the future individuals directly affected by the genetic engineering. Ethical human experimentation always requires obtaining permission (informed consent) of the subject prior to the experiment. This goes beyond any legal issue as many would consider Autonomy the most important principle of Beauchamp and Childress’s “Principles of Biomedical Ethics”. Informed consent is obviously not possible for germline genetic engineering as the future subjects of the current experiment are presently non-existent at the time of the experiment. While I believe there are many other valid reasons not to experiment on the human genetic germline, should the lack of informed consent continue to be one of them?

In short, if I am amused at the absurdity of Mr. Samuel’s demand that parents first obtain their children’s permission to be conceived prior to their conception, is it not equally absurd to use the lack of informed consent by the progeny of individuals whose germline we are editing as an additional reason to argue against genetic germline engineering?

Summarizing ethical issues with heritable human gene editing

By Jon Holmlund

A brief recap of reasons why we should not pursue heritable human gene editing:

It seems unlikely that risks to immediately-treated generations can be predicted with the accuracy we currently and reasonably expect from human subject research and medical practice.

Risks to later generations, that is, to the descendants of edited people, would be incalculable, and the informed consent of those later generations would be unobtainable.

To allow heritable gene editing even in the uncommon cases of untreatable, devastating genetic illness is to place too much faith in the ability of human providence to identify, and human behavior to observe, firm boundaries on its eventual use. 

Eventual use will become unavoidably subject to a eugenic approach in which the key decision will be what sort of people do we want, what sort of people should be allowed to receive life.

There will be no end to the disagreement over what edits should be permitted, and to the vilification of those considered to have been illegitimately edited, from those who object to their existence, perceived unfair advantage, or other characteristic.

Human populations will become stratified into the “edited” and the natural, introducing deep new justice concerns.  The main issue will be not will humans be gene-edited, but what should be the social status of those who are. 

To reduce heritable human gene editing to a reliable practice requires submitting it to the paradigm of manufacturing, as in drug development, with children seen as quality-controlled products of choice, not gifts of procreation.   To develop the practice, a “translational model,” again analogous to drug development, is necessary, with human embryos serving as raw materials, and, of necessity, a large, indeterminate number created and destroyed solely for development purposes, for the benefit of other humans yet to be born, and of those who would raise them.

Quite possibly, the translational model will demand great license on the extent to which embryos and fetuses may be experimented on; to wit, longer and longer gestations, followed by abortion of later and later stage, to further verify the success of the editing process.

In the extreme situation, the degree of editing may change the human organism in ways that will create a “successor” species to homo sapiens whose nature and desirability cannot be reasonably envisioned at this time.  In the extreme situation.

Even granting that this last scenario may never really arrive in ways that fiction writers can easily imagine, the other reasons should be enough that we simply don’t move heritable gene editing forward.

National Public Radio recently reported on the gene editing of human embryos—one day old—in the laboratory, in an attempt to correct and eliminate the inherited cause of blindness, retinitis pigmentosa.  The end is laudable.  The means is not.  We should not race ahead without considering why, first.  Then, we should not move ahead, but seek alternate means to the medical ends.

Edited embryos should not be created and brought to term—certainly not now, and I would say, not ever.  To be outraged over the former but not the laboratory creation of edited embryos is insufficient.  Both are outrages, although outrage over the recently-claimed birthing of edited babies in China is real, not “faux,” as one reaction held.  Still, the authors of that reaction are correct that one’s condemnation of the China event somehow justifies the laboratory work.  It does not. One last point: The Economist carried an essay decrying the birth of the edited twins in China as a case of “ethical dumping,” the practice of carrying out human subject research that would be disallowed in the West in other, perhaps less advanced (although China is certainly not backward), nations with fewer ethical scruples.  A valid point—but not one to cloak oneself in, while trying to justify the efforts to edit humans in ways that can be passed on from generation to generation.