Love in a Time of Pandemic

Last month’s story of Italian priest Don Giuseppe Berardelli giving up his ventilator so a younger patient could use it was an attention-grabber. The truth of the matter was a bit different, but the end result was, somewhat predictably, unchanged. Berardelli did refuse a ventilator, due to medical reasons. At the hospital, sometime in the night of March 15-16, the beloved, jovial, and accessible 72-year-old priest died from the coronavirus. He was one of at least 60 priests who succumbed to the SARS-CoV-2 virus during one month in Italy.

Physicians and dentists in Italy who have lost their lives to the coronavirus are listed here. In a similar vein, Medscape Medical News is maintaining (and adding to) a list, “In Memoriam: Healthcare Workers Who Have Died of COVID-19.” These are not the only victims, however. The frontlines are multitudinous, from people who work as clerks or deliverers of goods, to first responders, to all those caring for the ill (personally or professionally). These are exposed to increased risk of contracting the virus, and possibly dying from it. But these are not the first, nor will they be the last, to incur risk in such a manner.

History has much to teach us about staying at one’s post in difficult times. One of the prime examples is Martin Luther, who stayed in Wittenberg in 1527, in the midst of a bubonic plague outbreak. In response to multiple queries, he wrote a tract, “Whether One May Flee from a Deadly Plague.” His conclusion was that, unless someone can accomplish your duties in your absence, your presence is required.

  • Preachers and pastors: “For when people are dying, they most need a spiritual ministry which strengthens and comforts their consciences by word and sacrament and in faith overcomes death.”
  • Mayors and judges: “To abandon an entire community which one has been called to govern and to leave it without official or government, exposed to all kinds of danger such as fires, murder, riots, and every imaginable disaster is a great sin.”
  • Public servants like city physicians and city clerks: These “should not flee unless they furnish capable substitutes who are acceptable to their employer.”

Citing Matthew 7:12, Luther concluded that “we are bound to each other in such a way that no one may forsake the other in his distress but is obliged to assist and help him as he himself would like to be helped.”

Luther did not neglect the complementary side of the issue: prudent care of our bodies. He wrote, “I am of the opinion that all the epidemics, like any plague, are spread among the people by evil spirits who poison the air or exhale a pestilential breath which puts a deadly poison into the flesh.” Therefore, Luther recommended that one keep one’s distance from those ill (if they did not require help), set up hospitals to care for the sick, “help purify the air, administer medicine, and take it.” Luther, like the priests and health care professionals referenced above, provides a strong example of love in a time of pandemic.

Bioethics and the COVID-19 National Emergency

What a difference a couple of days can make. In the last blog entry, Steve Phillips discussed the problems that fear and panic are causing as we deal the many unknowns of the COVID-19 pandemic. While the current incidence, prevalence, and mortality of COVID-19 lags behind that of seasonal influenza (as well as past influenza pandemics caused by novel influenza strains), the eventual morbidity and mortality remain unknown. This uncertainty has caused public panic, which has lead to significant disruption of life, as we know it. A national emergency was declared in the US last Friday, calming some fears but reinforcing others. Using the four Principles of Bioethics as a simple outline, the following are some of the bioethical implications of the current COVID-19 pandemic I have recently considered – there is certainly space to add others.

Autonomy: The highly infectious nature of the new virus and the risks for the population as a whole place severe restrictions on individual autonomy. An individual is really not free to do whatever he or she wishes to do at this time. Measures to blunt the rate of infection spread have limited travel and will eventually cause some to be quarantined, perhaps against their will. Necessary public health measures will conflict with individual health decisions and desires. Do all individuals have a right to be tested for COVID-19 (particularly now that the test will shortly be free of charge) because they have a right to know or demand to know, or will we defer to protocols of best practice in the face of currently limited test availability, all of which are admittedly our best statistical utilitarian “guesstimates” for the benefit of the population as a whole?

Justice: The details of the pending National Emergency legislation are still not well known as of this writing but will apparently provide financial support to individuals and businesses affected by COVID-19 and this is certainly good, given the considerable disruption already caused by the fear and panic related to the disease, and the projected future impact of the actual illness itself. It is interesting to me that one result of this legislation may be that, with accurate testing, an individual or business will get federal benefits for having COVID-19 related problems but may not for similar influenza related problems. This is despite the fact that from an individual morbidity and mortality standpoint, particularly on a global basis, both COVID-19 and influenza both can end up causing severe health and secondary financial consequences. Asked differently, does justice require federalizing other viruses (or diseases) that, on a case-by-case basis, cause similar individual financial disruption as we will see from COVID-19?

Beneficence: I believe most people want to be helpful to others and do the right thing. Any desire to help others is somewhat counter balanced by lack of knowledge of exactly how infectious is the COVID-19 and therefore what risks do we assume for ourselves and for our immediate family in any benevolent activity in which we engage. Deciding how to help others without harming oneself will become clearer as the public health data grows.

Non-maleficence: Our natural tendency for self-preservation in uncertain times has resulted in a rush to hoard food and supplies, causing a severe strain on supply of these resources. Supply chains in a global “just-in-time” inventory structure are much more fragile as a result of COVID-19 than many had anticipated. Important medications, medical supplies, standard foodstuffs and infant needs are suddenly in short supply and are concerning; recent news videos of fights at your local Cosco over the last role of toilet paper are concerning for other reasons. Calls have gone out asking citizens to “hoard less”; hopefully these pleas will not fall on deaf and selfish ears.

For the Christian, wisely loving our neighbors may be the best ethical guideline and will look different in various regions and will likely change over time as we get a better understanding of COVID-19. I echo the many prayers for the health and safety of all affected by this pandemic and an extra measure of the Lord’s wisdom and strength for those in public health rising to meet and resolve this national (and worldwide) emergency.

Coronavirus 2019: A case of fear as a harm from technology

One of the ethical concerns in modern medicine is whether new technology developed out of a desire to help people may cause more harm than good. Most of the time we think about this in relation to therapeutic technology, but it may also be true of diagnostic technology. It is usually good to be able to diagnose diseases more accurately but learning about a diagnosis can cause significant stress and anxiety. When that is not balanced by significant benefit to the person learning the diagnosis, diagnostic information can cause more harm than good.

I think we are currently experiencing this type of harm from new diagnostic technology in the current outbreak of Covid-19, and it may be a while before we know whether our ability to diagnose this new virus has actually resulted in more benefit than harm.  Prior to the development of rapid viral DNA testing this new virus would not have been recognized early in the course of its spread. 3000 or 4000 additional deaths from viral pneumonia in China where there are 100,000 deaths from influenza annually might not have been noticed at all. However, there might have been more deaths if the relatively extreme limitations on movement had not been up imposed on the Chinese people in the region where the outbreak began. There has undoubtedly been benefit from being able to identify those who are infected with this new virus and isolating them to help prevent increased spread of the virus. However, knowing that this new virus exists has led to significant fear and panic. Some of the response has undoubtedly been excessive, and those excesses can cause harm. Locking down the entire nation of Italy, restrictions on travel that may be more than what is necessary, and the closing of workplaces does more than just impact the stock market. People are impacted by an overreaction to this new disease. Those of us who are more affluent have enough margin to get by, but there are those who live week-to-week and even day-to-day may be severely impacted by things that are being done more due to fear and panic than well-established public health strategies.

There are hopeful signs that the number of deaths in China from Covid-19 are rapidly decreasing, and if the impact in the rest of the world is no worse than what it has been in China, the deaths from this virus worldwide will be about 3 or 4% of the number of deaths from influenza each year. That is significantly less than the normal fluctuation in influenza deaths from year to year. It is not good that those people have died, but it is not the end of the world. The ability given to us by DNA technology to identify this virus will have helped through proven public health measures to decrease the impact of the disease, but will the overreactions due to fear and panic cause as much or more harm than the virus? We may never know.

The Non-Binary Doctor-Patient Relationship

Today’s blog entry continues another aspect of what Neil Skjoldal began yesterday. Shoshana Rockoff, writing in Yeshiva University’s The Commentator wrote about the changing landscape of physician private practice ownership and how that may be changing the doctor-patient relationship for the worse. She reflects on her grandfather’s private optometry practice when she describes the solid personal relationships that developed with his patients over his some 30 years of private practice. She worries what the future of that doctor-patient relationship will look like as both hospital systems and private equity firms, looking to make a profit, swallow up a growing number of practices. Her editorial is found here.

My personal practice experience is not too dissimilar. I began in private practice 30 years ago as a rehabilitation physician taking care of mostly inpatients who had recently suffered a stroke, spinal cord or head injury. I saw outpatients in my daily clinic that had the chronic neuromusculoskeletal sequelae of these problems. The chronic nature of their diseases resulted in my getting to know my patients fairly well, an attribute that I very much enjoyed.

What I did not enjoy was negotiating my reimbursement rates with the insurance system, something I was never trained to do in residency. As a solo practitioner, I had no clout with the large insurance carriers and my rates went down every year. Eager to pay back my student loan debt, I had also accepted a stipend to be the rehabilitation hospital’s medical director, which was my first experience with conflict of interest – I was responsible for making sure that only medically appropriate patients were admitted to the hospital while working with the administration of the hospital to maintain its financial viability at a time when insurance companies were beginning to aggressively assert their financial ability to reduce costs. It is rare, if not impossible, to wear two conflicting hats well, particularly at the same time.

I eventually joined a larger, multispecialty (mainly orthopaedic surgery) physician-owned group practice, where I remain today. Being part of a larger group allows us to negotiate more favorable reimbursement rates than my earlier experience but now from the dwindling number of consolidating insurance companies, who, along with the federal government Medicare and Medicaid programs, dictate those rates. My reimbursement rate has still gone down every year, now at a slower rate. A solo practice or small group private practice has no similar negotiating power with the insurance system. This is, if not the main reason, at least a significant reason that many of my colleagues who were in small physician-owned practices have decided to be acquired by large hospital systems or sell a portion of their assets to equity firms, who naturally exert some influence on future medical business decisions.

Economic decisions have not been isolated to the doctor side of the equation. Individual patients and smaller businesses that provide insurance to their employees lack the negotiation power with these same insurance providers and, over time, have had to settle for insurance coverage that contractually pays for fewer benefits at gradually increasing cost to those same patients or small businesses. Only very large companies or unions have any negotiation power to obtain better insurance benefits at less cost. The recipients of government sponsored insurance programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, have the least direct costs but also the least direct say in their medical benefits, and these programs presently dictate medical reimbursement for well over one-third of the US population.

I think Ms. Rockoff is correct that it is getting harder to maintain the same doctor-patient relationship that her grandfather and his patients enjoyed decades ago. I think the primary reason is that both doctors and patients have allowed third parties into that relationship, largely for economic reasons, a process that began even before her grandfather started his practice.

I am blessed to be part of a physician-run multispecialty group that remains committed to a (Judeo-Christianized) Hippocratic doctor-patient relationship. I know many of my corporate-employed colleagues desire and work to maintain the same relationship with their patients. Many non-medical business people running corporate practices want that type of relationship with their physician.

The real question may be how to have a doctor-patient relationship when the relationship is no longer binary, and likely never will be again.

Autonomy of Access vs. Autonomy of Decision Making in Opioid Addiction

A recent Perspective in The NEJM by Dr. Amy Caruso Brown discussed the ethics consultation involved in treating addiction as a terminal disease. Since the article is behind a subscription firewall, I will briefly summarize the case and some of the ethical problems outlined by Dr. Brown. The focus of this blog is to ask the limited question as to whether or not there is sufficient patient autonomy to make decisions in an addiction situation described as terminal if, as Dr. Brown claims, society has failed to provide sufficient access to and services for patients with chronic addiction and/or mental health problems associated with similar levels of addiction.

Dr. Brown’s patient, Ms. A, was an unemployed, homeless woman who had a history of chronic opioid use/abuse and had failed multiple impatient rehabilitation, methadone maintenance and buprenorphine treatment programs. She was hospitalized for septic shock secondary to endocarditis, which had damaged two heart valves to such a degree that she was not considered healthy enough to survive surgery to correct the problem. Her only relative, a brother, who had recently finally cut ties with his sister to protect exposing his children to her illness and habits, agreed to a do-not-resuscitate order. To the surprise of her treating staff, her condition stabilized to the point where the cardiothoracic surgeon agreed to operate. She declined, wanting to be discharged so she could seek morphine to self-treat the intractable chest pain. She fired her attending physician as he made the ethics consultation referral questioning her decision-making capacity.

Dr. Brown nicely outlines the particular issues of legal capacity requirements required in New York and the limited capacity that surrogates have if they we not previously designated as such. Dr. Brown also discussed whether or not Ms. A met the criteria for terminal illness, specifically whether or not ongoing chronic opioid addiction, in the face of now severe cardiac compromise, would be expected to cause death within 6 months. Dr. Brown maintained that Ms. A was lucid and capable to make informed decisions, which were that she “simply wanted to go home, or to a hospice facility, and die peacefully.” Dr. Brown did not find her depressed or emotionally compromised, though quoted her as saying “I’m done. I’m ready to be done. I’ve fought long enough” and described her as “exhausted and grieving”. Dr. Brown believed Ms. A’s “decisional capacity was clear.”

Finally, Dr. Brown argued that society had failed Ms. A by not facilitating access to a treatment program that “included medication for opioid use disorder (OUD) – preferably initiated in an inpatient setting and coupled with ongoing trauma-informed mental health care and various social supports – [in the absence of which Ms. A] would almost certainly have a relapse”, further making it likely she would die within 6 months. Though the article noted Ms. A had previously failed inpatient rehabilitation, methadone maintenance and buprenorphine, it was not stated how coordinated or integrated the previous programs were. Was the proposed program new or simply a second (or third) chance through a similar program? Thankfully, Ms. A decided to accept palliative terminal care, which resolved her homeless situation, as it would be provided at an inpatient facility.

What if Ms. A had declined inpatient palliative care? Dr. Brown made a strong case that Ms. A’s social situation (poor, homelessness, mental health history of abuse and chronic opioid dependence/abuse) limited access to an appropriate treatment program for her problems, likely the only one with any expectation of success, however limited. Even if we grant that Ms. A was indeed terminal and had clear decision-making ability not compromised by depression, ongoing opioid dependence and other mental health factors, did her social situation really allow her to be autonomous in decision making? Said differently, how can we consider her autonomous for decision-making when she apparently lacks autonomy for access to her treatment? Further, how much support can an individual demand or expect from society and still be considered autonomous? I have touched on a similar issue in this blog previously with regard to serial pregnancy in opioid addicted women, asking when should the risks to the children (and social and financial burden to society) supersede the mother’s autonomy for having more children?

We need to improve access to treatment and support for mental health in general and opioid treatment in particular. This will likely include further discussion regarding the level of autonomy of those needing that treatment and support.

Determining Fairness in Healthcare

The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) had a recent Perspective on proposed bill H.R. 3 aimed at reducing federal spending on prescription drugs. A main component in the bill authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a “Fair Price Negotiation Program” that, beginning in 2023, would permit the secretary to negotiate with pharmaceutical companies the price paid by the federal government on 25 drugs each year. The article provides a broad overview of the bill as it discusses some of the economic pros and cons as well as the political back and forth that would be required to allow this bill to become law. The link is behind a subscription firewall but provides an option for free access to a limited number of articles with registration.

Call me cynical but anytime I see the word “fair” associated with a bill in Congress, I immediately wonder “for whom?” The article is quick to point out that the “negotiation” effectively means “price regulation and severe penalty for noncompliance” by the drug manufacturers. The article describes in general the method that will be used to set the maximum price of a given drug. How or why did Congress determine that method as the best for determining the Fair Price? Also, not all drugs will be included in the group subjected to negotiation. If it is good or fair (as determined by Congress) for drug prices to be determined/set/negotiated by our government, should not all drugs be negotiated similarly so they are fairly priced?

Bills like H.R. 3 are part of the larger discussion of what I call the ultimate “Rights vs. Obligations” in the delivery of healthcare. If healthcare is a human right, who is obliged to provide that right? In the present case of medication pricing, if the present cost of a drug is too high, who is obliged to offset that cost (read – pay the difference between “too high” and “fair”)? The provision of healthcare, generally, and the creation, testing and production of medications, specifically, have real costs. Are these costs fair? Who will pay these costs? The patient? The doctor? The hospital? The pharmaceutical industry? Should healthcare be for-profit? If so, how much profit? Should healthcare become a utility with strict(er) oversight? Can the market decide a fair cost or price? Can a utility board? Can our elected representatives? How about a group of really (and I mean really) smart, unelected bureaucrats?

Thoughtful answers to any one of these questions should be submitted immediately to your local congressperson. Collectively, they are presently the ones determining fairness (in a real bioethical sense) in healthcare.

Assisted Suicide and Disability

On October 9th, the National Council on Disability (NCD) released a report on the dangers of assisted suicide laws as they relate to persons with disabilities. The report provides a nice background on the history and justification of the Council’s position against assisted suicide as far back as 1997. The present report, available here, provides an update on its rationale for its continued opposition to assisted suicide laws. The report, and its references, provide an excellent resource for those of us who argue against assisted suicide regardless of the presence or absence of a disability.

Eight states and the District of Columbia have legalized assisted suicide in some form since Oregon led the way in 1994. Additionally, while lacking a specific assisted suicide statute, a state supreme court decision in Montana in 2009 is believed to provide a defense for physicians who practice assisted suicide. Oregon has provided the statutory framework for existing assisted suicide laws as well as proposed or pending legislation in states moving in this direction. As a result, every state where assisted suicide is legal claims that a primary need for the law is to preserve a person’s dignity, a claim that NCD finds particularly troublesome for people with disability:

The idea that hastened death is a pathway to dignity for people facing physical decline reveals the public’s extreme disparagement of functional limitations and a perception that “dignity” is not possible for people who rely on supports, technology, or caregivers to be independent or alive. Many hold the attitude that a person with a disability may be better off dead than alive.

Assisted suicide is often the cheapest “treatment” for many chronic medical problems affecting those with disability, a fact not lost on those responsible for state Medicaid budgets. NCD provided example after example of patients in Oregon who were denied treatment for their chronic or terminal medical care only to be offered coverage for assisted suicide within the same denial letter. Such crass efficiency was too much even for California, who in 2015, passed a law correcting this behavior: “[a]ny [insurance carrier] communication shall not include both the denial of treatment and information as to the availability of aid-in-dying drug coverage.” Many patients or their physicians eventually were provided the information on assisted suicide by the very same insurance carrier in a follow-up phone call.

Another major issue discussed within the NCD report was the relationship of depression and suicidal ideation in patients with a new disability:

Research overwhelmingly shows that people with new disabilities frequently go through initial despondency and suicidal feelings, but later adapt well and find great satisfaction in their lives. However, adaptation takes considerably longer than the mere 15-day waiting period required by Oregon-model assisted suicide laws.

Perhaps the most persistent concern by NCD since 1997 continues to be “the major gap between informing the patient of alternative options [such as palliative care programs and long term-term services/supports] and those alternatives actually being available and provided.” All statutes legalizing assisted suicide include provisions that require a full explanation of all of the programs, resources, and options available to assist the patient if he or she does not decide to pursue suicide. However:

Many people with disabilities find this to be a very shallow promise when they know that all too often the programs are too few, the resources are too limited, and the options . . . often nonexistent.

The concerns articulated in the NCD report warning of the dangers of assisted suicide apply just as forcefully for those without disability. We should join their efforts to educate law makers on a better way forward without assisted suicide.

Stem Cell Rx No Longer For Sale on Google

Perhaps once a week, I will be asked by a patient about the potential benefits of stem cells for reversing the normal affects of age, particularly with respect to arthritis of the knee joints, hip joints or the degenerative discs in the lumbar spine. I believe one of the reasons for this interest has come from increasing advertisements by various clinics in my region of East Tennessee claiming stem cells are the answer for these problems. My region is not unique. A simple Google search on “stem cells for knee pain” yields ads for clinics offering such treatment.

Stem cells are cells that have potential to become any type of cell in the human body such as a new blood cell, nerve cell or bone/cartilage cell. Scientists are rapidly learning how to find or create stem cells, as well as how to safely use them to replace old or missing cells, thus restoring function in worn out, damaged or diseased areas of the body. In fact, stem cells are presently used to replace the bone marrow for some individuals with certain cancers and disorders of the blood and immune system, and in many of these cases, the results are lifesaving.

The problem is that stem cell treatment remains yet unproven in all other medical conditions, including the age-related arthritis conditions which I treat. This lack of efficacy has not stopped clinics from offering and patients from receiving stem cell injections with the hope of achieving improved function or cure. I am willing to grant that many offer these treatments with the sincere hope and belief that they are acting in their patient’s best interest, though I suspect not all have the patient’s best interest in mind. Unfortunately, there have been severe adverse events. Examples include blindness following an injection of stem cells into the eye, and loss of function with development of a spinal cord tumor following stem cell injection into the spine.

The FDA is trying to educate the public and prevent stem cells from being offered for unproven treatments. The FDA has the authority in the US to stop these unproven treatments and take punitive action if needed. This is not to suggest that the FDA is in the business of preventing legitimate investigation into the potential benefits of stem cells, such as this Mayo Clinic Phase 1 study looking at the risks of injecting stem cells in to the cerebrospinal fluid of patients following a spinal cord injury to see if this particular stem cell technique causes harm (with future studies needed to determine benefit).

The FDA is recently getting some help from Google. On September 6th, Google announced it would stop accepting ads for unproven medical treatments, including stem cell therapies. It is early in the effort and the initial link above still has four ads for non-bone marrow stem cell treatments returned with the Google search. Maybe by the time you read this blog entry, the stem cell ads for unproven treatments will be gone.

I am hopeful that stem cells will eventually provide patients with safe therapies that repair injury and return patients to normal health. Offering that promise without the studies that prove such benefit is unethical and potentially harmful. It is good to see Google favoring human welfare over financial profit.

Whose Body?

In 1923, Dorothy L. Sayers published her first mystery featuring Lord Peter Wimsey, entitled Whose Body?  The concern was that an adult body, wearing only a pince-nez, had been found in someone’s bathtub. Whose body was this? Was it the body of a well-known financier, who had recently disappeared? Or was it the body of someone else? Whose deceased body was this?

Slightly less than one hundred years later, the nation that Sayers called home has answered that question. As of Spring, 2020, in England, and a few months later in Scotland, deceased adult bodies are the State’s for purposes of organ procurement – unless they are in an “excluded group” or have registered an “opt out” decision.  The public is currently being assured that organ procurement will not apply to all who die, but only to those whose organs would be in a “usable condition”—primarily those dying in intensive care units or accident and emergency departments.

The law of “deemed consent” applies to all but these excluded groups:

  • Those under the age of 18
  • People who lack the mental capacity to understand the new arrangements and take the necessary action
  • Visitors to England, and those not living here voluntarily
  • People who have lived in England for less than 12 months before their death

The language of “deemed consent” is the iron fist in a velvet glove. According to the National Health Services’ FAQ page:

 If you have not recorded a decision either way and you are not in an      excluded group, your family will be approached and asked if they have any information about your organ donation decision. If no information is available, it will be considered that you consent to donate your organs and your family would be expected to support this.

Although the language of donation is used, gifts are what is “given.” To call what is “taken” or “coerced” a gift is to contort language into misrepresentation.

It is a conundrum the government is trying to solve. Every day, some people needing organ transplants die. Every day, some people with potentially transplantable organs die. Inviting people to decide whether or not they want to be organ donors, and register that decision, seems a reasonable step. But deciding that the government has the right to take organs upon death is overreach. Human organs are not property. We do not “own” our organs. Whether one views human beings as ensouled bodies or embodied souls, human organs are integral to those bodies.  The government did not give the people organs; it is an injustice – to the language and the people – to take human organs and call such “donations.”

Promoting vaccination with a not-too-heavy hand

This week’s Nature has a worthwhile read, “Mandate Vaccination with Care.”    The recent rise in the number of cases of measles is well-documented in the general press, and there is a strong argument that it is a social good that sufficient numbers of children be vaccinated for a range of infectious diseases.  Your correspondent considers it unfortunate, to put it mildly, that there is a persistent belief that vaccines for the standard childhood diseases are harmful.  Although some cases of vaccine harm occur, they are rare—rarer than many in the general public believe—and the cost of under-vaccination is great.  I, for one, never want to see an infant with pertussis (whooping cough) again, and, although I recall having had measles and chicken pox when I was a kid, it’s best to prevent them.  Some can even be eradicated (see: smallpox—which we should fervently hope is never purposely re-introduced, now that we don’t routinely vaccinate for it). 

In brief, the authors in this case argue for promoting vaccination in the public with such steps as ensuring supply and access, providing information and allowing public forums, monitoring safety carefully, and tracking vaccination rates.  They argue, reasonably, that mandatory vaccination that carries the wrong kind of penalties—such as, fines or even jail sentences imposed in some countries—for non-compliance actually can harm poorer, medically underserved people, and as such be counterproductive and, frankly, unfair.  They comment that harsh mandates can unnecessarily prompt a backlash, with increased resistance.

They say, further, that if mandates are deemed “politically appropriate,” then the procedures should be just, with constraints on choice as limited as possible; any penalties must be proportionate; those who do suffer complications should be adequately compensated.   They speak favorably of creating administrative hurdles to getting exemptions from mandates.  They also argue against governments mandating only some vaccines while excluding others.  They claim that making some vaccines only “recommended” can limit the uptake of all. 

This last point may be the most questionable of all in this article.  It is easier to justify mandating vaccination for highly contagious diseases that can have devastating effect (e.g. measles, rubella, diptheria, and others), than, for example, vaccination for human papilloma virus (HPV), infection with which predisposes to certain kinds of cancer but transmission of which is through sexual activity.  In this last case, the argument for a mandate is substantially weaker; vaccination at a fairly young age might be wise, but one might still reasonably accept, for oneself or one’s child, the less certain and more remote risks of the consequences of infection, and therefore reasonably object to mandated vaccination.

Again, a worthwhile read. >