Is More “Ruining” of Medicine on the Way?

By Mark McQuain

Ask older medical doctors their opinion on the current state of the practice of medicine and I suspect the majority will give you an earful, generally along the lines of “How [blank] has ruined the practice of medicine”, filing in [blank] with any number of things, including the government, insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies or doctors themselves. “Ruined” is a strong claim and even if true, I certainly don’t know how to assign blame as there is probably plenty to go around. Regardless, new initiatives by any one of these groups warrants watching. So, a recent September 20 NEJM editorial about a proposed change in reimbursement by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) made me wonder if more “ruining” is on the way.

The NEJM article nicely summarizes the current state of affairs (additional summary for those without subscription below):

“Medicare pays for office visits using five levels of codes based on clinical complexity, medical decision-making complexity, and time. For visits with established patients, physicians are currently paid $22, $45, $74, $109, and $148 for levels 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 visits, respectively; for new patients, they receive $45, $76, $110, $167, and $172. This pricing structure in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, established by Congress in 1989, is the basis for physician payment by both public and private payers.”

CMS is proposing to collapse levels 2-5 reimbursements into a single payment of $93 for established patients and $135 for new patients. Documentation requirements would also be reduced to level 2 requirements thus arguably reducing some of administrative bureaucracy physicians say interferes with patient care, allowing them to spend more of this freed-up-time with patients. As an “older medical doctor”, I am certainly happy to reduce my administrative burdens so this sounds good. What could possibly go wrong with: “CMS is from the government and they are here to help”?

The authors of the NEJM article applaud CMS for their efforts to reduce administrative burden but then go on to list some potential unintended consequences. The biggest is that physicians lose the financial incentive to care for more complex patients. They hypothesize that this could result in some physicians reducing office visit times and bringing patients back more frequently, thus fragmenting the care of more complex problems and patients. They also worry that this payment policy will further maintain disparities between physicians who spend practice time on so-called cognitive evaluation and management issues versus time on the portions of their practice that receive reimbursement from procedures, imaging or laboratory fees. Lastly, if private payers don’t follow suit, the authors point out that physicians may shift further away from providing care for Medicare and Medicaid patients in favor of private insurance that does reimburse better for the complex problems.

Reimbursement is only one factor affecting today’s practice of medicine though certainly one that cannot be ignored. Many Christian physicians consider their practice of medicine as more of a calling than simply their occupation. I pray that external factors be kept from “ruining” that calling.

The Sad Case of Daniel Te’o-Nesheim

BY NEIL SKJOLDAL

The New York Times  recently published a lengthy article on Daniel Te’o-Nesheim, a former NFL player who died at age 30 after playing football for half his life.

With all the recent information about the dangers of football-related head trauma, it is not surprising to learn that upon his death, Te’o-Nesheim’s family donated his brain to the Boston University CTE center, where it was found to have chronic traumatic encephalopathy.  The Times article states that Te’o-Nesheim had suffered approximately 100 concussions.  His is another tragic story of someone who dies much too early, in part because CTE drove him to erratic behavior.

The Times article also details Te’o-Nesheim’s other football related injuries. According to his attorney, Sam Katz, an orthopedist told him that “he had one of the worst cases of degenerative arthritis in his ankles that he had ever seen.  He also found damaged knees and shoulders, pinched nerves in his neck, and a tendon tear in his biceps.”

What is particularly troubling about this situation is that a day after his death, the NFL denied his earlier claim for “line of duty” benefits, where his attorney had listed all of his ailments and injuries from playing football.  According to The Times, his claims were denied because“his injuries were not severe and numerous enough.”  His family contested the denial, and months later they were finally awarded $17,500 posthumously.

While denying people benefits the first time around might seem to be best practices within a ‘for-profit’ business model, it hardly seems like it addresses the much more important issue of promoting the health and wellness of the patient.  This seems especially true in this case, as a former employee who used the means available to him to ask for assistance for injuries that obviously were a result from his employment within the NFL.

It is cases like Te’o-Nesheim’s that makes me think that bioethics should speak clearly not only to those who provide frontline care, but also to the business side of the equation.

Reducing Abortion Regardless of Roe v. Wade

By Mark McQuain

The selection of the next Supreme Court Justice has perhaps naturally unleashed a flurry of op-eds describing the post-apocalyptic world that will result from any partial or complete reversal of Roe v. Wade. In the July 18th, 2018 Perspective in the NEJM, Dr. Julie Ingelfinger offers the tragic case of a foreign nursing student she befriended while both were training in New York in the late 1960s. The student was finishing her final nursing year and was engaged to be married when she became pregnant despite the use of contraceptives. Per Dr. Ingelfinger, neither the student nor fiancé had “the means to provide for a baby, so they reluctantly decided that terminating the pregnancy was the only choice.” The only abortion option available at that time, pre-Roe v. Wade, was a “back-alley abortion.” After the abortion, the student developed sepsis, resulting in a hysterectomy and kidney failure. Dr. Ingelfinger oversaw the dialysis and despite appropriate medical care, the student died suddenly from complications of the dialysis. Dr. Ingelfinger’s reason for sharing this story now is to remind us that back-alley abortions resulted in similar complications in many other young women pre-Roe v. Wade and warn that if Roe v. Wade is overturned in the future, young women seeking abortion will again suffer the same fate as her nursing student friend.

In a similar vein to Dr. Ingelfinger’s editorial, there is a second op-ed on CNN website on May 5, 2018 by Danielle Campoamor entitled “Why Supporting Abortion is a Pro-Life Position”. She fears any future restrictions in Roe v. Wade will result in the suffering or death of young women seeking an abortion and wants everyone to have the “safe, affordable and relatively easy abortion” that she experienced:

“I wasn’t subjected to mandatory waiting periods, forced counseling or an abortion provider required to regurgitate state-mandated, inaccurate information. I didn’t have to travel long distances, worry I was getting there too late in the pregnancy, find money to pay for child care or walk past angry or intrusive protesters. Instead, I went in pregnant and, a few hours later, came out with my future back in my control.”

In both articles, the focus is unilaterally on the health and life of the mother. Ms. Campoamor’s position is easily challenged, if not decimated, by including the health and life of the baby in her calculus. Dr. Ingelfinger’s premise requires more unpacking.

Her position appears to be that all future unwanted pregnancies in an overturned-Roe v. Wade world would require a pre-Roe v. Wade “back-alley” surgical abortion. Many Latin American countries have never legalized abortion yet their illegal abortion fatalities have dropped as medical abortifacients (morning after pills) have replaced surgical abortion methods. Interestingly, both the author of the previously linked article on the Latin American experience and Dr. Ingelfinger cited economics (and not legality) as a main reason for choosing abortion. Analysis of the statistics on why women in the US choose to abort challenges this assertion. A clear understanding of these statistics might help identify strategies that lead to a voluntary reduction in the number of abortions, absent changes in the legal status of abortion.

There is a nearly 15-fold increased risk to carry a baby to full-term than it is to have an elective abortion. We have “successfully” divorced sexual activity from the risk and responsibility of bearing and rearing a child, as long as we are willing to use abortion as the definitive stop gap in maintaining our birth control. From my standpoint, this success and this control has come at a terrible price, namely the deaths of over 60 million babies in the US alone. Sadly, I pessimistically do not believe that there will be a meaningful change in the Federal law regarding abortion, regardless of who becomes our next Supreme Court Justice (link requires subscription). There are simply too many women and men who have come to rely upon the type of control of their future activities that abortion provides. Therefore, I ask Dr. Ingelfinger, Ms. Campoamor and all of those on the other side of the abortion divide: must all unwanted pregnancies end in abortion (medical or surgical), regardless of the status of Roe v. Wade?

Mumbling orphans—a bit more

Mark McQuain has raised the persistent, vexing issue of the pricing of drugs for rare diseases—in the case at hand, Sarepta’s eteplirsen (Exondys 51) for Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, the disease over which the late comedian Jerry Lewis lost sleep every Labor Day weekend for years.

Mark provided an excellent summary (he calls it “crude,” but it’s anything but that).  In this case, the concern is not just price for a truly rare disease, but whether the drug showed sufficient evidence that it worked for FDA to approve it.  In the absence of alternative treatments, that was the truly tempestuous issue for Sarepta.  (Recall that under the 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic act, drug manufacturers in the U.S. may not sell a drug unless the FDA finds it not only safe, but effective—a standard that generally applies worldwide.)  It’s one thing for a drug to have a high price, but rather another if it doesn’t work, or doesn’t work very well.  (I decline to comment publicly about the Sarepta data; outside my expertise.  Those seeking a case in point may wish to consider Avastin for breast cancer.)

And to be sure the high price concern dogs other treatments that appear to work quite well—such as high-profile ones for cystic fibrosis or for cancer.  A case can be made that such drugs are worth the price, that too much government heavy-handedness risks stifling innovation, and that a search for the “just price” is misguided, but also, for sure, that society should share the costs of some of these drugs, that measures should be taken to limit out-of-pocket costs to disease sufferers, and that reimbursement approaches are ripe for overhaul.  In that last bucket: if drugs work only some of the time, only pay for the cases in which they do work; foster true competition (rather than having the costs of all drugs in a class go up when a new one is introduced, as if drugs were houses); eliminate the middle man (i.e., pharmacy-benefit managers that take a cut—that appears on the horizon); and the “biggie,” having government payers push back harder on prices.  At least some of these measures seem likely, and at least some seem warranted.

But overall, high costs for truly innovative treatments are justifiable, where no alternatives existed previously and especially when other, more expensive and quite possibly less effective medical treatments may be obviated (see: drug treatment for hepatitis C vs liver transplantation).  This is not to endorse price gouging for existent, cheap drugs that fall into an incidental monopoly (in which case, BTW, elimination of said monopoly, through regulatory facilitation of alternative sources, is warranted).

The Cost of Getting RNA to Mumble

By Mark McQuain

In my previous blog entry, I crudely summarized the genetic basis for Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD) and one pharmaceutical company’s (Sarepta) current effort to research, manufacture and finance a genetic treatment that increases the production of a muscle protein missing in patients with DMD called dystrophin. Please see my previous blog entry for that summary or this article for a more detailed thorough overview of the science and investigational process to date. For this blog entry, I want to consider the bioethics of the cost of Sarepta’s treatment eteplirsen (Exondys 51), currently estimated on average to be around $300,000 per year.

DMD is a devastating disease that generally causes the patient’s death by his mid-twenties but it only affects a very small number of boys and young men worldwide, estimated to be around 400-600 newborn males in the US each year. This small number of patients places medications for DMD in a category called Orphan Drugs, those that benefit fewer than 200,00 people per year. Eteplirsen is only beneficial in the 15% of DMD patients that have the specific RNA defect in dystophin protein production that eteplirsen corrects. Back-of-the napkin calculations mean that if 15% of all 600 boys born in the US every year with DMD (90 boys per year) used Sarepta’s $300,000-per-year drug, that is a $27 million increase in revenue (not profit) to Sarepta each year. While that sounds huge, it ignores the massive expensive cost barriers to bringing such a drug to market, including research, investigational studies to gain FDA approval and legal financial risk with future adverse effects yet unknown. Inability to gain FDA approval prohibits access to capital markets necessary to fund such a process. Were it not for grants available for orphan drugs, it is unlikely that eteplirsen would exist. Better for drug makers to target their R&D to a bigger disease market for the chance of a bigger reward (consider Bayer aspirin and their $3.3 BILLION profit in 2011 alone).

There are calls for Sarepta to “give back” some of their potential future income, calls from the very organizations that were their staunchest supporters in their FDA approval process. Strong ethical arguments are made that the company did benefit early on by using federal grants and this alone should require the company to reduce a portion of their future income by lowing the cost to patients. Calls for the FDA to federalize Sarepta’s patents and take government ownership will most certainly go unheeded as that would cause every other orphan drug manufacturer to immediately discontinue any further financial risk for fear of similar confiscation.

There are, however, opportunity costs beyond the financial. Some would say that the FDA approved eteplirsen with extremely flimsy data, as less than 10 boys showed borderline promising results when the drug was approved in November 2016. That FDA approval allowed Sarepta to survive as a company. Per the editorial board at the Wall Street Journal(subscription needed):

“But if FDA had cashiered that therapy, Sarepta would have lacked the resources to continue its research and testing to treat Duchenne and develop what may be an even better drug. If eteplirsen had failed to get approval, dollars and brain power would inevitably have flowed toward treating other diseases with more promise of success. FDA has tremendous influence over private investment.”

Indeed Sarepta has new genetic treatments in the pipeline which reportedly do provide increased levels of dystrophin, even for RNA patterns beyond what eteplirsen can presently correct. Have the ends justified the means? Presently, for DMD patients, despite the $300K yearly price tag for eteplirsen, that answer may be – yes. Sadly, there are no other currently functional treatment options for DMD – yet.

From a public health standpoint (and a public funding standpoint), orphan drugs for treatment of small population diseases like DMD are non-starters. Is the only answer to provide the opportunity for great financial reward to encourage individuals to assume all of the private risk?

Britain’s experts on gene-edited babies

by Jon Holmlund

Some of the cable news shows ran segments on the report released this week by Britain’s Nuffield Council on Bioethics, “Genome editing and human reproduction: social and ethical issues.”  Full disclosure: I have not yet read the full report, only the short summaries (all of which are available for free download at the link here).

The TV teasers—”U.K. bioethics council says that gene-editing children may be morally acceptable” were accurate.  The key conclusion is that “the use of heritable genome editing interventions to influence the characteristics of future generations could be ethically acceptable in some circumstances” (emphasis theirs).  But the news folks made it sound like an attempt to birth an edited baby is around the corner, or at least fully green-lighted by Nuffield.

The summary of the report reads more modestly, acknowledging that such attempts are currently banned by law most places, and that making them legal could require “a long and complex legislative pathway.”  But the Council does take the view that at least some attempts, such as those to try to repair a lethal disease gene such as the dominant gene for Huntington’s disease, might be justifiable.  This blog has considered such an argument in the case of sickle cell anemia—single gene defect, well understood, circumscribed attempt to repair only that gene.  An argument can be made.

The Nuffield Council’s summary really is a list of general statements that, taken individually, are hard to take issue with, and are in some cases almost platitudinous.  The overall impression is, “yes, heritable human gene editing could be ethical, and probably should be considered, but only after a long public deliberative process, appropriate regulation, etc., etc.”  Nuffield offers two stipulations for ethically acceptable heritable human gene editing:

  • “Intended to secure, and is consistent with, the welfare of a person who may be born as a consequence” of the effort, and
  • Social justice and solidarity are upheld; that is, discrimination or social division should not be a consequence.

These statements are both too broad to be helpful.  In the first case, the Council acknowledges that some efforts could be attempts to enhance a person’s natural characteristics, not just treat a recognized disease, and that, except for the most genetically straightforward cases, the scientific and technical challenges are substantial.  In the second case, it would seem that pressures for discrimination based on social attitudes or economics (ability to pay for the procedure, medical insurance reimbursement issues) will be unavoidable.

Scientifically and socially, there will be unintended—or at least undesirable—consequences.  These may be known but considered acceptable.  For example, how many human embryos will need to be created and destroyed to perfect the procedure?  How many generations will need to be followed to rule out some late complication?  Can we really guarantee that “having babies the old-fashioned way” won’t become a thing of the past?  And, in spite of the laudable desire to bring healthy children into the world, wouldn’t this be a wholesale acceptance of the basic assumption that only the people we want to be born, should be born?

For these reasons and others previously articulated on this blog, heritable human gene editing falls into a small but critical group of biomedical undertakings that should not be pursued.

And, BTW, the remaining bugs in the system include, as reported this week, that gene-editing techniques appear to introduce errors more frequently than previously appreciated.  Given that heritable human editing involves more than just a few cells in a dish, a “presumption to forebear” should apply.

The TV news gave this about 5 minutes this week.  That’s the breadth and depth of our “public deliberation” beyond a few experts.  At the end of one segment, the host looked into the camera and said, “next up: are liberals or conservatives happier?”

As Neil Postman said:  “now this…”

Forcing RNA to, at least, Mumble…

BY MARK MCQUAIN

We are at a turning point in medicine where instead of supplementing patients with proteins or enzymes that their bodies fail to manufacture due to genetic abnormalities, we soon may be able to re-engineer the abnormal DNA, restoring the DNA’s ability to instruct the body to make those same proteins or enzymes. On our way to full-fledged genetic engineering, we have learned that DNA makes something called RNA, which can be thought of as specific instructions for assembling these vital proteins, telling cells exactly how to assemble protein building blocks, called amino acids, in their proper sequence. Even a very minor disorder in a very long amino acid sequence of a protein can cause that protein to function poorly or not at all. When bad DNA makes bad RNA, or when good RNA gets subsequently damaged or misread, the protein either gets assembled in a garbled fashion, or not at all. Think of RNA as the boss of protein production who can speak clearly, mumble or say nothing at all. Recently, there is one well-known disease where it looks like it is possible to force bad RNA that presently says nothing at all to, at least, mumble.

The disease is Muscular Dystophy (MD) and the missing necessary protein is called dystrophin. Dystrophin is responsible for the structural integrity of muscle. Poorly formed or garbled dystrophin results in a mild form of MD, such as one called Becker Muscular Dystrophy (BMD) where patients can live well into their 40s or 50s. If no dystrophin is produced at all, a severe form of the disease called Duchenne MD (DMD) results, in which muscles simply fall apart over a shorter period of time, causing patients to stop walking in their teens, usually dying in their twenties from cardiac or respiratory muscle failure. While it would be great to restore normal production of dystrophin in patients with DMD, one company called Sarepta, appears to be able to cause patients with DMD, who normally do not make any dystrophin, to produce a garbled dystrophin, giving them a milder BMD-like disease.

Consider the following sentence: “The big red fat cat bit the sly fox and ate the shy jay”. The individual letters represent the RNA sequence and the three letter words represent unique amino acid protein building blocks, resulting in a meaningful protein sentence – think of this as the normal dystrophin protein in a healthy person. If the RNA was missing the 22nd through 24th letters (the 8th word “sly”), the sentence becomes: “The big red fat cat bit the fox and ate the shy jay”. It is a minimally garbled version of the first sentence but still meaningful – think of this as the dysfunctional dystrophin in milder BMD. If the original RNA sequence was missing only the 7th and 8th letters, the sentence becomes: “The big dfa tca tbi tth esl yfo xan dat eth esh yja y”. This sentence has no meaning beyond “The big” – think of this as no dystrophin in severe DMD. If we could get the RNA reader to ignore the first letter “d” in the last RNA sequence, the sentence becomes: “The big fat cat bit the sly fox and ate the shy jay”. We are back to a minimally garbled version of the first sentence but still meaningful – think of this as another dysfunctional protein in a milder “Becker-like” MD. This is how scientists at Sarepta appear to have taken an RNA sequence that originally said nothing and forced it to mumble, producing a new garbled form of dystrophin, which works better than no dystrophin at all.

I realize this has been a long walk in the weeds for some of our regular readers but hopefully it has provided some helpful background into the current treatment of MD and a sense of how much further we have yet to go. I will use this blog entry as background for my next blog entry to discuss some of the bioethics around the cost of getting RNA to mumble.

For now and for me, advancing medical knowledge like this convinces me of how fearfully and wonderfully we are made. (Psalm 139:14)

Vaccines: Modern Trolley Car Dilemmas

BY MARK MCQUAIN

The Trolley Car dilemma is back in bioethics news. For those unfamiliar with the trolley car dilemma, you alone are responsible to operate a trolley track switch to divert an out-of-control trolley car away from five workers on one section of track only to cause the death of a lone worker on the only alternate section of track. The dilemma: someone is going to die, and you get to decide who. In a recent editorial in the June 13th New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Lisa Rosenbaum nicely describes the utilitarian dilemma surrounding the public health risks and benefits associated with a vaccine for the dengue virus, a mosquito-borne virus that annually causes significant severe illness and death worldwide. The dengue vaccine, Dengvaxia, is a real-world trolley car dilemma. Dengvaxia presently can protect large numbers of patients from this deadly virus, but at the expense of causing severe illness and death in a much smaller number of patients, mostly children.

Dr. Rosenbaum describes our response to utilitarian thinking, correctly I think. We don’t mind utilitarian rules that negatively affect others, particularly when the rules tend to confer benefit to our group as a whole (the very definition of utilitarianism) but we resist utilitarian thinking when it threatens to affect us negatively as an individual despite overall benefit to the rest of our group. Healthy self-interest often conflicts with the utilitarian calculus that purports to determine the overall benefit to the group. In the case of Dengvaxia, if the deaths caused by the vaccine only occurred in people who would have died from the natural dengue virus anyway, there would be no problem. In other words, by golly, you all were going to die from the widespread disease anyway, and since the vaccine did save some of you from dying, there is really no new or additional loss. Net positive outcome, right?

Sadly, vaccines do not work that way. With Dengvaxia, it may be possible to create a pre-vaccine test for seropositivity for the virus. This would mean determining whether a person previously had a very mild case of the virus such that they would not suffer a catastrophic outcome from receiving the vaccine, thereby allowing them to safely receive the vaccine to prevent a more severe case of dengue in the future. Such a screening test may be possible but it would cost some unknown amount of additional money and would still not be 100% accurate. Even so, no vaccine is 100% safe.

How many lives would need to be saved and at what cost before we are satisfied with the cost/benefit ratio of Dengvaxia (or any vaccine for that matter)? Presently the World Health Organization is recommending a pre-vaccination test be developed and only vaccinate those who test positive for prior exposure. This is effectively saying that the vaccination is not only not required but not even presently recommended in endemic regions, this despite the fact that Dengvaxia clearly significantly reduces overall mortality and morbidity. If the disease were more contagious and more lethal than dengue, at what point does the vaccine, however imperfect, become mandatory? This is the ultimate trolley car switch for public health officials.

Aren’t trolley car dilemmas fun?

Care Dis-integration

The May 3rd edition of the New England Journal of Medicine brings us a powerful story. It is a tale of a patient, named Kenneth, written by his physician brother.

Central to the story is a delay in diagnosis, brought on by unfamiliarity with the patient as a whole person, biases against those with mental illness, presumptions and other errors familiar to those of us with an inside view of what can go wrong. The healthcare system allows these to occur through its “dis-integration.” From the story:

Rosenbaum highlights the larger problem: “Care integration is an attitude.” But this “attitude problem” affects countless U.S. patients, not just those with mental illness (or severe physical disabilities, like quadriplegia).Whose attitude, then, needs adjustment? Many doctors and nurses seethe about the profit-driven dis-integration of our health care “market” yet insist they can’t fix this mess themselves. Kenneth, no stranger to cognitive dissonance, said, Well, if they can’t fix it, who the hell can? This question becomes more urgent as our health care system’s balkanization becomes increasingly “normalized.”

I have just seen this up close. A friend of mine has a terminal illness. While he has long been well-served by his family physician, the onset of the illness brought specialty care, extensive and repeated imaging, hospitalizations, a rehabilitation facility, and no more contact with his physician. It also brought delayed diagnoses which seemed avoidable had he been seen regularly by someone who knew his story and his usual condition.

Wasn’t such familiarity what we always had hoped would come from the “specialty” of family medicine? And that years of familiarity would lead to an understanding no stranger could have? Such an understanding would give us what we longed for in medicine, such as more efficiency, avoidance of excessive and intrusive testing, smoother transitions of care, more acute perception of changes (and quicker diagnoses), and better advice.

Increasingly, however, the family physician of today can no longer fulfill the promise of the profession from decades past. Financial constraints keep him in the clinic exam room, efficiently churning through patients within a narrowing scope of practice— no longer on the wards, or in the nursing home, or performing obstetrics, or even seeing children under two. Unable to venture out because time (equals money) would be lost, he is no longer involved in the care of his patients when they need something beyond his clinic. And it is in those intense moments that he is needed the most.

I would like to have a simple answer. Kenneth’s question stings: “Well, if they can’t fix it, who the hell can?” The financial pressures are enormous, however. Costs are up for countless reasons, and to keep the money flowing, a physician becomes the engine that must keep running… inside the engine room that is the modern day clinic.

Perhaps nothing short of a major disassembling of our medical system will change that. Such change may only come from catastrophe; even then any rebuilding would take a level of insight and courage…and preparation…that are unlikely to appear in future leadership under modern pressures. If we’re ever to move toward a dream of “care integration,” however, we’ll have to start somewhere– with understanding where we are, how we got here, and where we ought to go.

One Man’s Trash is Another Man’s DNA Treasure

Last month, investigators used big data analysis, public DNA genealogy websites and “Discarded DNA” to identify the Golden State Killer (WSJ subscription needed), an individual believed responsible for over 12 murders, greater than 50 rapes and over 100 burglaries in California between 1974 through 1986. While justice may be served if the legal case remains solid, there are some interesting bioethical issues that warrant discussion.

This blog has previously discussed the ethics of searching reportedly anonymized databases and the ability of algorithms to “unanonymize” the data (see HERE and HERE). The current technique used in the Golden State Killer case takes this one step further. Using a public genealogy database site, where individuals looking for distant relatives voluntarily share their personal DNA samples, investigators looked into these databases for partial DNA matches. A partial DNA match means that the investigators were looking for any relatives of the original suspect hoping to gain any identifying information of the relative, leading back to the original suspect. Then, using this narrower group of DNA relatives, investigators literally collected DNA samples this group of people unwittingly left behind, such as skin cells on a paper cup in the trash, so called discarded or abandoned DNA.

One man’s trash is another man’s DNA treasure.

Presently, neither the method of partial DNA search of public voluntary genealogy databases nor the collection of discarded DNA samples violates the 4th Amendment regarding unreasonable search and seizure. Neither the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) nor the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) provide protection as none of the data relates to health care records or employment, respectively.

Shouldn’t some law or regulation prevent my personal DNA code from becoming public, particularly if I have not taken steps to publicize it on one of the many public voluntary genealogy sites?

Since your DNA is the ultimate physical marker of personal identity, how much control do you or should you have over it? While you may wish to live a life of anonymity, your extroverted cousin who voluntarily provides her DNA to a public DNA database has just unwittingly publicized some portion of your family DNA as well as traceable personal family data that may allow others to know more about you than you desire. An energetic sleuth dumpster-diving your trash can retrieve your actual DNA. I shred my mail to avoid my social security number or other personal financial information from being obtained and used for identity theft. How do I “shred my DNA” to prevent it from being similarly recovered from my trash?

What may someone do with my DNA information obtained using these techniques. What should someone be able to do?

You could not have convinced me back in 2001 that anyone would spend money to build cars with 360 video equipment and figure out optimal routes that would eventually become what is now Google Street View. Might not someone do the same thing with trash-sourced DNA samples, perhaps Google DNA View?

We already have figured out the garbage truck routes.