Oddly, I enjoy reading Supreme Court decisions, particularly the dissents, even though I am not a lawyer. I gain similar enjoyment watching a good game of chess even though I am not a great chess player. Nerd that I am, I think I become smarter for the effort in both cases. I beg the reader’s indulgence on the legal background before getting to the ethical or theological portion of this blog entry but, after all, the case regards abortion, which usually demands a legal “walk in the weeds”.
Three weeks ago, the New York Times reported on a recent Supreme Court decision (June Medical Services, LLC et al v. Russo) that struck down a Louisiana law that attempted to place restrictions upon physicians who perform abortions by requiring them to have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals in case there were complications. In overturning the law, Judge Breyer, writing for the 5-4 majority opinion, made the case that requiring physicians to have said admitting privileges would reduce the number of physicians performing abortions in Louisiana, creating a burden on access to abortion. He was able to cite precedent with an almost identical Texas law that was struck down by the Court in 2016 (Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt)
There are many legal and ethical rabbit holes to explore in both cases. For the sake of brevity, I have picked one. Chief Justice Roberts was the fifth and deciding vote for the majority in the present case. What makes this interesting is that he joined the dissent in the earlier Texas decision, a decision he admits that he remains convinced was decided incorrectly, but voted recently with the majority to use the precedent of that prior case to strike down the Louisiana law. He wrote a separate concurring opinion to explain himself. In it, he begins:
“I joined the dissent in Whole Woman’s Health and continue to believe that the case was wrongly decided. The question today however is not whether Whole Woman’s Health was right or wrong, but whether to adhere to it in deciding the present case.”
My translation of this is: “Our first decision was terrible but instead of fixing our error, we should make a second terrible decision based upon the first – that way, at least we are consistent.”
And, legally, consistent they are.
Roberts’ problem with the Supreme Court’s Texas decision rested not with the specific medical or ethical questions as to whether physicians performing abortions should have admitting privileges at local hospitals or whether such requirement truly placed a limiting burden on women seeking abortion but rather the legal technicality of whether or not those questions had been previously and properly adjudicated. Res judicata (claim preclusion) prevents cases from being (potentially repeatedly) re-adjudicated between the same parties. Roberts joined Alito’s dissent, arguing the Texas case was an example of res judicata and should never have been heard. In Alito’s words: “The Court favor[ed the] petitioners with a victory that they did not have the audacity to seek”
With the Texas decision now law, Robert’s recent decision was to give precedent to that previous decision. Stare decisis (“to stand by things decided”) allows us to rely that courts will not change laws erratically. Robert’s sixteen page separate concurring opinion decided the Court’s 5-4 recent decision and was his attempt to justify giving precedent to a previous case he still believes was wrongly decided. Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh each wrote dissents effectively having none of his argument.
All this brings me to the bioethics portion of this blog entry regarding this case. If Supreme Court decisions are not concerned with determining right and wrong (per Roberts), then what are they concerned with? Decisions having to do with abortion literally have lives hanging in the judicial balance. Justice Thomas, writing in his dissent in Whole Woman’s Health said:
“Our law is now so riddled with special exceptions for special rights that our decisions deliver neither predictability nor the promise of a judiciary bound by the rule of law.”
He went even further in his dissent in this present case, stating that the Court was unbound by the Constitution itself, when the Court concluded…
“…that Louisiana’s law is unconstitutional under our precedents. But those decisions created the right to abortion out of whole cloth, without a shred of support from the Constitution’s text. Our abortion precedents are grievously wrong and should be overruled.”
Justice Thomas is indirectly talking about the legitimacy of the Court. Theologian Richard John Neuhaus discussed the problems of legitimacy that courts will face when the Law deviates from what he called the “Rightness of Things”. In a speech he delivered at the centennial celebration of the School of Law at Valparaiso University in the late 1970s, he concluded (as do I):
“[W]ith regard to law, there is nothing in store but a continuing and deepening crisis of legitimacy if courts persist in systematically ruling out of order the moral traditions in which western law has developed and which bears, for the overwhelming majority of the American people, this society’s sense of right and wrong. There is in store a continuing and deepening crisis unless a transcendent moral purpose is reasserted by which the state can be brought under critical judgment, unless it is made clear once again that the state is not the source but the servant of the law.
“With apologies to Spinoza, transcendence abhors a vacuum. Today there is such a vacuum in the public space of American law and politics. Unless it is democratically filled by the living moral traditions of the American people, it will surely be filled, as has so tragically happened elsewhere, by the pretensions of the modern state. As the crisis of legitimacy deepens it will lead — not next year, maybe not in twenty, but all too soon —to totalitarianism or to insurrection or to both.”