Where do I Store the Name of your Dog?

Following a long office day of wrestling with my current nemesis, our office electronic medical record (EMR), I was pleased to read a lovely article by Dr. Taimur Safder in the current NEJM entitled “The Name of the Dog”. I’ll not summarize it as the link is free and the article is short and makes the point of today’s blog wonderfully.

I realize the EMR is not actually alive and, lacking agency, is unable to act as my archenemy and cause my downfall, or that of my patients. Further, I have a degree in electrical engineering so the technology of the EMR is not the issue either. I will grant that current and future data mining of the EMR may benefit untold numbers of patients. I will also concede that EMRs will (eventually) be bolstered with AI tools that will improve diagnostic accuracy and reduce or eliminate costly unnecessary testing.

My concern is that the EMR causes me to focus so much on the data collection that I spend less time getting to know my data source (my patient) as more than the sum total of discrete data points. There really isn’t any good place in the EMR to put the name of my patient’s dog. If I am going to treat my patient as more than a something, perhaps as a someone, then more than just reductionistic data acquisition and processing will have to take place.

With that in mind, please take a moment to view one of my favorite paintings by Sir Luke Fildes at the Tate Gallery called “The Doctor”. The painting depicts a country doctor sitting at the bedside of a young patient, with the child’s parents in the background. One can imagine the concern of the child’s father and almost feel the anguished prayers of the child’s mother, but both are interestingly relegated to background positions in the painting. The focus of the painting is the focus of the lamp in the painting – the country doctor and his patient.

Medicine in the 19th Century was limited in terms of meaningful data collection and limited further by actual effective treatments. In other words, the EMR of the 19th Century could have been completed in mere minutes and the diagnosis and treatment, such as it was, rendered in a few minutes more.

Given those limitations, perhaps not surprisingly, one gets the sense that the depicted outcome was far from certain and also that the country doctor had been in the home a while – there was at least time for tea at the table. What on earth was he still doing there? Maybe in absence of a definitive diagnosis and immediate cure, what the doctor could provide was his time, his empathy and his focused, loving concern. One gets the sense he would likely remain with his patient and the family as long as he was needed to offer what help and hope he could.

That seems like a reasonable example of how one imago Dei might care for another.

Would that I could consistently convey that level of steadfastness, that empathy and that loving concern to all of my patients without frantically looking for that special place in my EMR to store the name of your dog.

Starting with moral conclusions vs. foundational principles

By Steve Phillips

Last week I wrote about how Jeremy Williams’ moral position on sex-selection abortion was influenced by his position on abortion itself. Reflecting a little more on what he wrote raises the question of what comes first in our reasoning about a moral issue. Do we start with fundamental principles or with previously held moral conclusions? It is not a simple question.

Abortion is such a significant issue that it tends to dominate bioethics at times. Ethicists who defended the permissibility of a woman choosing abortion in the 1970s seemed to begin with the idea that abortion was permissible and then work back to reasons to support that position. Those reasons included an analogy of a violinist being attached to a person without her permission and the idea that some human beings were not actually persons. However, this process of starting with a conclusion is not exclusive to those who support abortion. Many of my students begin with a strongly ingrained belief that abortion is wrong without a good understand of why they believe that. They then address other issues according to how that would affect their belief that abortion is wrong.

My first reaction is that proper moral reasoning should begin with foundational moral principles, but those who take the casuist approach to ethics say that rigidly following principles can lead us astray. They say we should we should begin with a paradigm case in which the moral conclusion is clear and then determine how much the situation we are considering is like and unlike the paradigm case. Even Beauchamp and Childress who have helped to define the principles of biomedical ethics say that those principles are in a significant way influenced by our considered moral judgments and not just based on ethical theories.

So why do I think we should start with foundational principles? That goes back to why I think there is such a thing as moral right and wrong. I believe that morality itself exists because we were created by and live in a world created by a moral being who is by nature good. God’s innate goodness causes ethics to exist. If we were the result of chance and unguided evolution, we would have no reason to believe that such things as right and wrong exist. If ethics exists due to the moral character of God, then God’s moral qualities are the foundation of ethics. His expression of those qualities in scripture and through his incarnate Son form the foundational principles for ethics. That is where we need to start.

Is More “Ruining” of Medicine on the Way?

By Mark McQuain

Ask older medical doctors their opinion on the current state of the practice of medicine and I suspect the majority will give you an earful, generally along the lines of “How [blank] has ruined the practice of medicine”, filing in [blank] with any number of things, including the government, insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies or doctors themselves. “Ruined” is a strong claim and even if true, I certainly don’t know how to assign blame as there is probably plenty to go around. Regardless, new initiatives by any one of these groups warrants watching. So, a recent September 20 NEJM editorial about a proposed change in reimbursement by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) made me wonder if more “ruining” is on the way.

The NEJM article nicely summarizes the current state of affairs (additional summary for those without subscription below):

“Medicare pays for office visits using five levels of codes based on clinical complexity, medical decision-making complexity, and time. For visits with established patients, physicians are currently paid $22, $45, $74, $109, and $148 for levels 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 visits, respectively; for new patients, they receive $45, $76, $110, $167, and $172. This pricing structure in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, established by Congress in 1989, is the basis for physician payment by both public and private payers.”

CMS is proposing to collapse levels 2-5 reimbursements into a single payment of $93 for established patients and $135 for new patients. Documentation requirements would also be reduced to level 2 requirements thus arguably reducing some of administrative bureaucracy physicians say interferes with patient care, allowing them to spend more of this freed-up-time with patients. As an “older medical doctor”, I am certainly happy to reduce my administrative burdens so this sounds good. What could possibly go wrong with: “CMS is from the government and they are here to help”?

The authors of the NEJM article applaud CMS for their efforts to reduce administrative burden but then go on to list some potential unintended consequences. The biggest is that physicians lose the financial incentive to care for more complex patients. They hypothesize that this could result in some physicians reducing office visit times and bringing patients back more frequently, thus fragmenting the care of more complex problems and patients. They also worry that this payment policy will further maintain disparities between physicians who spend practice time on so-called cognitive evaluation and management issues versus time on the portions of their practice that receive reimbursement from procedures, imaging or laboratory fees. Lastly, if private payers don’t follow suit, the authors point out that physicians may shift further away from providing care for Medicare and Medicaid patients in favor of private insurance that does reimburse better for the complex problems.

Reimbursement is only one factor affecting today’s practice of medicine though certainly one that cannot be ignored. Many Christian physicians consider their practice of medicine as more of a calling than simply their occupation. I pray that external factors be kept from “ruining” that calling.

The Sad Case of Daniel Te’o-Nesheim

BY NEIL SKJOLDAL

The New York Times  recently published a lengthy article on Daniel Te’o-Nesheim, a former NFL player who died at age 30 after playing football for half his life.

With all the recent information about the dangers of football-related head trauma, it is not surprising to learn that upon his death, Te’o-Nesheim’s family donated his brain to the Boston University CTE center, where it was found to have chronic traumatic encephalopathy.  The Times article states that Te’o-Nesheim had suffered approximately 100 concussions.  His is another tragic story of someone who dies much too early, in part because CTE drove him to erratic behavior.

The Times article also details Te’o-Nesheim’s other football related injuries. According to his attorney, Sam Katz, an orthopedist told him that “he had one of the worst cases of degenerative arthritis in his ankles that he had ever seen.  He also found damaged knees and shoulders, pinched nerves in his neck, and a tendon tear in his biceps.”

What is particularly troubling about this situation is that a day after his death, the NFL denied his earlier claim for “line of duty” benefits, where his attorney had listed all of his ailments and injuries from playing football.  According to The Times, his claims were denied because“his injuries were not severe and numerous enough.”  His family contested the denial, and months later they were finally awarded $17,500 posthumously.

While denying people benefits the first time around might seem to be best practices within a ‘for-profit’ business model, it hardly seems like it addresses the much more important issue of promoting the health and wellness of the patient.  This seems especially true in this case, as a former employee who used the means available to him to ask for assistance for injuries that obviously were a result from his employment within the NFL.

It is cases like Te’o-Nesheim’s that makes me think that bioethics should speak clearly not only to those who provide frontline care, but also to the business side of the equation.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

After all the press that CTE has received in the past five years (including a major feature film),

 

A Huge Step Closer to Fully-Artificial Human Reproduction

by Jon Holmlund

Last week, the Washington Post reported that scientists in Japan have created human egg cells—oocytes—in the laboratory from reprogrammed blood “adult” stem cells. This work has been published in the journal Science (open access to the abstract only; subscription or purchase required for the full scientific article; WaPo has a limit on free articles before subscribing).

This is large. And, I think, troubling.

The skinny: research on human embryonic stem cells is, in my view and many others, ethically unacceptable because human embryos have to be destroyed to obtain them, and because the earliest cells are capable of maturing into full human beings (babies) under the right circumstances, meaning that said earliest cells are tiny human beings. But about 10 years ago, “reprogrammed” stem cells were produced in the laboratory by taking adult cells and treating them so that they take on a primitive state. In that state, they aren’t capable of forming an entire human but they can be induced to become almost any cell in the body. This gives them tremendous potential for research and possibly treating human disease—much of that potential essentially ethical if proper research ethics are observed.

However, commentators wiser and more knowledgeable than I have said in the past that, in principle, these “reprogrammed” cells, also called induced pluripotent stem cells, could be made into human germ cells—sperm or eggs. To my knowledge, that had not been done before now. Now it’s closer to being reality. The Japanese scientists created early egg cells, too immature to be fertilized, but that is the next project. Add to that the possibility of “reprogrammed” sperm.

This raises the possibility of in vitro fertilization of one of these “reprogrammed” eggs to create a full embryo which, as in current IVF, could be implanted into a woman to impregnate her and, ultimately, bring a baby to birth. Treatment for infertility? Sure. Need to harvest eggs from a would-be mother or an egg donor? Not necessary, in principle. Would the baby turn out OK? Not known—after all, these are not “natural” egg cells we’re talking about.

The development raises at least the issues previously raised by human cloning. Heretofore, cloning would proceed usually by taking an adult cell’s nucleus, inserting it into an egg cell that had its nucleus removed, and treating the resulting new “egg” to develop, not an easy task and one on which progress has been limited. Now, the “artificial egg” would be fertilized to create a new human—at least one step less removed from natural reproduction, on its face anyway.

If fully implemented, it would complete the move to babies-without-sex. Wesley Smith sees “mass human cloning.” That’s only the half of it. The WaPo article also pointed out these possibilities: babies from cheek smears; babies created from a person’s cells without that person’s awareness or consent; more routine screening for genetic disease; IVF becoming the norm. Add to that the notion that full-on IVF could some day be possible, with cells maintained in the lab as raw materials to be “reprogrammed” to sperm and eggs, eliminating the need for identified moms and dads.

This is all a ways off yet, but that’s how all these humanity-altering changes start. Smith is right, that for this and other technologies (heritable human gene editing, animal-human hybrids, totally artificial life forms like “SHEEFs”), a massive public discussion is needed. Where I think he errs is in looking to government to do it. This will have to be grass roots. And making that happen will be a new career for somebody, and a tough way to make a living. But the train has left the station and is gaining momentum.

https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/human-cloning-technology-debate-policy-consensus-needed/

Noninvasive prenatal testing and sex-selection abortion

By Steve Phillips

The National Health Service in Great Britain has decided to implement the use of noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) and that has raised some concerns. It would seem natural for there to be concern about this test used to detect prenatal genetic conditions such as Down syndrome, which commonly leads to the choice to abort the fetuses with those conditions. However, according to a recent article in The Conversation by Jeremy Williams one of the major concerns is the use of this technique to facilitate sex-selection abortion. Williams states that one of the major political parties has proposed a policy of banning the use of NIPT for sex determination and has described sex-selective abortion as “incredibly unethical”.

Williams concedes that the idea that sex-selection abortion is morally wrong and ought to be prevented is widely held even by those who otherwise have no moral objection to abortion but suggests that taking that position is problematic for those who believe that a woman has a right to choose to have an abortion. Williams lists several reason that people give for why the sex-selection abortion is wrong. These include idea that sex selection abortions are done due to a trivial preference, concern that sex selection abortion constitutes unjust discrimination against female fetuses, concern about women being coerced into this type of abortion, and that it teaches that the lives of girls are not as important as boys. He is concerned that if these reasons are accepted they would apply more broadly than to just this one type of abortion, and he is right. Many abortions are done for reasons that seem trivial compared to the value of the life of the fetus. Any abortion that is done because of the characteristics of the fetus, including having a genetic disorder such as Down syndrome, are both unjust discrimination against those who have such a disorder and express a message that people who have such a disorder do not have the same value as those who do not. Many women are pressured into having abortions, and do not actually freely choose them.

The problem with what Williams has written is that sex-selection abortion is just clearly wrong. It is wrong to kill a fetus because that fetus is female and end the life of the girl and woman who that fetus would have become just because she is female. That is a clear violation of women’s rights. The fact that this helps us see that abortions in other situations are also clear violations of more universal human rights should make people question whether those abortions are also wrong. It does not mean that sex selection abortion is permissible.

Avoiding advanced dementia, part 2

By Steve Phillips

Last week I wrote about one of my moral concerns regarding Norman Cantor’s proposal to avoid advanced dementia, which he views as being intolerably degrading, by using an advance directive stating that when he reached a certain level of dementia he no longer wanted to eat or drink so that his death would result. My concern with this was that the person caring for him would have to concur with him that his life at that time was no longer worth living in order to justify following his directive and cease to feed him and give him fluids to drink. An independent assessment that another person’s life is not worth living is required of any physician or other caregiver who participates in euthanasia or assisted suicide. Such a determination that another person’s life is not worth living is something that we should never do and the need for that determination is a fundamental reason why euthanasia is not permissible.

Dena Davis in her article “Avoiding Dementia, Causing Moral Distress” agrees with Cantor that a person ought to be able to use an advance directive to end his own life to avoid advanced dementia, but sees a flaw in Cantor’s plan. She writes, “As long as the demented person is enjoying her diminished life, it will be psychologically and emotionally difficult, perhaps impossible, for most people to withhold food or even simple medical interventions. Even if they believe they ought to comply with the advance directive, the moral distress is simply too great.” She concludes that since a person cannot rely on others to follow an advance directive like Cantor’s, the only way to avoid advanced dementia is preemptive suicide. The article “A Debate over ‘Rational Suicide’” in the New York Times describes 80-year-old Robert Shoots doing just that.

My second concern is that it is wrong for us to choose to end our own life by rational suicide even if no one else participates in that act. Autonomy and personal liberty are important, but there are some things that can be wrong to do even to ourselves. This is easier to see from a Christian perspective. Christians understand that our lives belong to God and we do not have the authority to end our lives. That authority belongs to God alone. We have been commanded not to kill any innocent human being because we have all been made in the image of God. That includes a command not to end our own lives.

It can be harder for someone who does not understand that his life belongs to God and has value because he has been made in God’s image to see why rational suicide would be wrong. However, all of us are relational beings. We are connected to our families and the rest of humanity. What we do to ourselves impacts others. Those who contemplate rational suicide to avoid things such as advanced dementia forget how their deaths impact others. They have a desire to avoid a part of life they do not want to live and may want to relieve those who love them from the burden of caring for them but caring for those we love when they become dependent is an opportunity for us to be more fully human. Caring for a loved one with dementia is very hard but is one of the ultimate expressions of human love. We should not take that away from those who love us.

Getting the Best Possible Organs for the Rest of Us

By Mark McQuain

A recent September 6th Perspective in the NEJM entitled “Voluntary Euthanasia – Implications for Organ Donation” teases with the following lead-in:“Canada now permits physicians to hasten the death of a patient by means of physician-assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia. This development creates a new pathway for organ donation – and with it, some challenges.” Kudos to the NEJM marketing department for luring me into finally buying a full subscription. I’ll summarize some key points for those without a subscription.

The article begins by summarizing some differences between the comatose patient receiving end-of-life care in a standard ICU environment and the situation of individual intending voluntary euthanasia in a hospital. Healthcare teams may rely on surrogate decision making in the first instance but require first person consent in the euthanasia instance. Also, use of sedatives and analgesics in traditional end of life care are guided by the doctrine of double effect (intending comfort but not death) whereas physicians are not legally required to titrate those same medications in the instance of voluntary euthanasia (where euthanasia is legal). These issues are effectively the non-controversial portion of the article.

The heart of the article dealt with what one ought to do in the situation of a patient who wants to donate his or her organs “in the best condition possible” while receiving voluntary euthanasia. This would involve “procuring the patient’s organs in the same way that organs are procured from brain-dead patients (with the use of general anesthesia to ensure the patient’s comfort).”

The problem is that these patients aren’t brain dead yet. The authors are frustrated that awaiting brain death, even in voluntary euthanasia, results in sub-optimal quality of the donor organs. Harvesting organs from voluntarily euthanized patients before they are brain-dead “would require an amendment to the Criminal Code of Canada, which defines medical assistance in dying as the administration of a ‘substance’ by a qualified provider. By this definition, organ retrieval is not an accepted cause of death.” (N.B.- Though it most certainly is the cause of death!)

For those unable to retrieve the NEJM article, I offer a similar article by Dominic Wilkinson and Julian Savulescu supporting the same ethical argument (that it is OK to cause the death of an individual by harvesting their organs if they wished voluntary euthanasia). They summarize Dr. Robert Truog’s bioethical position (one of the authors of the present NEJM article) in footnote 66 as follows:

“Truog’s justification for ODE [Organ Donation Euthanasia] is different from that presented here [in our paper]. He argues that current concepts of brain death and the dead-donor rule are incoherent, and he proposes an alternative based upon the principles of autonomy and non-maleficence. We find Truog’s arguments compelling. Our paper can be seen as providing a complementary argument in favour of ODE. Truog favours a narrow definition for the group of patients who may consent to this procedure: only those who will die within minutes of withdrawal of life support, or who are permanently unconscious. Our definition of LSW [Life Support Withdrawal] donors overlaps with Truog’s, but includes the larger group of patients from whom it is permissible to withdraw life support in intensive care, and whose death is highly likely to ensue (though not necessarily instantly).”

To be blunt, what both groups are arguing is that it should be OK to surgically remove organs from an individual who is not brain dead though has already consented to voluntary euthanasia, knowing that the surgical removal of the organs will cause the immediate death of the individual. The priority of marrying euthanasia and organ donation is obtaining the best possible organs for the rest of us.

As a counter argument, I again turn to Wesley Smith for his thoughts in a recent National Review article similarly entitled “Canada Conjoining Euthanasia/Organ Donation”. It is short and to the point.

I must concur with Wesley Smith: The slippery slope of euthanasia is getting more slippery. How long before we grease those skids further by paying for the organs so harvested?

Avoiding advanced dementia

By Stephen Phillips

Norman Cantor has prompted widespread discussion with his recent article “On Avoiding Deep Dementia” in the Hastings Center Report (link is to the abstract only). In his article he states that he finds the possibility of living through progressive cognitive dysfunction and helplessness an intolerably degrading prospect. As a result, he has proposed using an advance directive stating that when he would reach a certain level of cognitive impairment, which would include having lost the capacity to make his own medical decisions, his advance decision to voluntarily stop eating and drinking would be implemented resulting in his death. He argues that it would be morally proper for those caring for him at that point to follow his prior instructions even if he showed no appearance of suffering at that point in his life.

There are many moral concerns related to Cantor’s proposal. I would like to address two concerns. Today I will address a concern that his proposal has in common with any form of euthanasia or assisted suicide that requires the assistance of someone other than the person who is choosing to die. In a later post I will address the issue of true rational suicide in which no assistance from a second party is required.

By proposing a strategy for avoiding advanced dementia that involves waiting until after he is unable to make decisions on his own, Cantor has required that someone other than himself who is providing care for him must implement his instructions. He sees that as respect for his autonomy, but whenever a second person enters into an act of euthanasia that person must make an independent decision that it is reasonable to agree that the life of the person who is to die is not worth living. This is true whether the act that is being requested of them is active euthanasia, assisted suicide, or cessation of eating and drinking. We are not morally obligated to do anything that another person requests of us. One qualification for fulfilling a request from another is that the request be reasonable. If there are any circumstances under which it is morally permissible to participate in ending another person’s life it could only be when that person’s life is no longer worth living. While it might be maintained that a person could make that determination about his or her own life, anyone assisting in that death needs to make an independent decision that the person’s life is not worth living in order to determine that this is a reasonable request which should be granted. However, we should never make a determination that another person’s life is not worth living. Our concepts of human equality, universal human rights, and justice all depend on the idea that every human life has value. All of that is undermined if we can say that there are some human lives that no longer have value.

Cantor’s proposal requires that someone caring for him after he has been become unable to make his own decisions agree with his previous determination that when his dementia reached that point his life would no longer be worth living and should be ended. That is something that we should never do.

Reducing Abortion Regardless of Roe v. Wade

By Mark McQuain

The selection of the next Supreme Court Justice has perhaps naturally unleashed a flurry of op-eds describing the post-apocalyptic world that will result from any partial or complete reversal of Roe v. Wade. In the July 18th, 2018 Perspective in the NEJM, Dr. Julie Ingelfinger offers the tragic case of a foreign nursing student she befriended while both were training in New York in the late 1960s. The student was finishing her final nursing year and was engaged to be married when she became pregnant despite the use of contraceptives. Per Dr. Ingelfinger, neither the student nor fiancé had “the means to provide for a baby, so they reluctantly decided that terminating the pregnancy was the only choice.” The only abortion option available at that time, pre-Roe v. Wade, was a “back-alley abortion.” After the abortion, the student developed sepsis, resulting in a hysterectomy and kidney failure. Dr. Ingelfinger oversaw the dialysis and despite appropriate medical care, the student died suddenly from complications of the dialysis. Dr. Ingelfinger’s reason for sharing this story now is to remind us that back-alley abortions resulted in similar complications in many other young women pre-Roe v. Wade and warn that if Roe v. Wade is overturned in the future, young women seeking abortion will again suffer the same fate as her nursing student friend.

In a similar vein to Dr. Ingelfinger’s editorial, there is a second op-ed on CNN website on May 5, 2018 by Danielle Campoamor entitled “Why Supporting Abortion is a Pro-Life Position”. She fears any future restrictions in Roe v. Wade will result in the suffering or death of young women seeking an abortion and wants everyone to have the “safe, affordable and relatively easy abortion” that she experienced:

“I wasn’t subjected to mandatory waiting periods, forced counseling or an abortion provider required to regurgitate state-mandated, inaccurate information. I didn’t have to travel long distances, worry I was getting there too late in the pregnancy, find money to pay for child care or walk past angry or intrusive protesters. Instead, I went in pregnant and, a few hours later, came out with my future back in my control.”

In both articles, the focus is unilaterally on the health and life of the mother. Ms. Campoamor’s position is easily challenged, if not decimated, by including the health and life of the baby in her calculus. Dr. Ingelfinger’s premise requires more unpacking.

Her position appears to be that all future unwanted pregnancies in an overturned-Roe v. Wade world would require a pre-Roe v. Wade “back-alley” surgical abortion. Many Latin American countries have never legalized abortion yet their illegal abortion fatalities have dropped as medical abortifacients (morning after pills) have replaced surgical abortion methods. Interestingly, both the author of the previously linked article on the Latin American experience and Dr. Ingelfinger cited economics (and not legality) as a main reason for choosing abortion. Analysis of the statistics on why women in the US choose to abort challenges this assertion. A clear understanding of these statistics might help identify strategies that lead to a voluntary reduction in the number of abortions, absent changes in the legal status of abortion.

There is a nearly 15-fold increased risk to carry a baby to full-term than it is to have an elective abortion. We have “successfully” divorced sexual activity from the risk and responsibility of bearing and rearing a child, as long as we are willing to use abortion as the definitive stop gap in maintaining our birth control. From my standpoint, this success and this control has come at a terrible price, namely the deaths of over 60 million babies in the US alone. Sadly, I pessimistically do not believe that there will be a meaningful change in the Federal law regarding abortion, regardless of who becomes our next Supreme Court Justice (link requires subscription). There are simply too many women and men who have come to rely upon the type of control of their future activities that abortion provides. Therefore, I ask Dr. Ingelfinger, Ms. Campoamor and all of those on the other side of the abortion divide: must all unwanted pregnancies end in abortion (medical or surgical), regardless of the status of Roe v. Wade?